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Download Court Copy [Cites 114 , Cited by 0 ] Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati State Of Andhra Pradesh vs K Dhanunjaya Reddy on 19 November, 2025 APHC010472472025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3396] (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY,THE NINETEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION No. 9363/2025 Between: 1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT, ADDL.S.P.CID, CLD HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/o.Munegowda Govindappa, Age about 61 years Flat No.101, H.No.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, Burri Residency, Road No.11, City Center, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Petition under Section 437 / 438 / 439 / 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court Pleased to (i) Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crimp No. 1446 of 2025 whereby default bail has been granted to the Accused No.32 consequently (ii) Quash and set aside the Official Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of Office Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition,the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crimp No. 1446 of 2025, till the hearing and final disposal of the present Petition and pass 2 IA NO: 3 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to remand Respondent/Accused 33, u/ S.309 CrPC/ S.346 BNSS till the hearing and pass Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. SPL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR CID Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. INAKOLLU VENKATESWARLU APHC010472482025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3396] (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY,THE NINETEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION No. 9364/2025 Between: 1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT, ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/o. Rama Subba Reddy, Age about 67 years, Villa No. 9A, Sunrise Valley, Upperally, Attapur, Rangareddy, Telangana. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Petition under Section 437 / 438 / 439 / 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court Pleased to (i) Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crimp No. 1447 of 2025 whereby default bail has been granted to the Accused No.32 consequently ii) Quash and set aside the Official Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crimp No. 3 1447 of 2025, till the hearing and final disposal of the present Petition and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of official Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass IA NO: 3 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to remand Respondent/Accused 32, u/ S.309 CrPC/ S.346 BNSS till the hearing and pass Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. SPL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR CID Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. T NAGARJUNA REDDY 4 APHC010472492025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3396] (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY,THE NINETEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION No. 9365/2025 Between: 1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT, ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K. Reddenna, Age about 61 years, I.A.S (Retired), R/o. Flat No.1004, C Block Fortune One, Road No. 12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, Telangana. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Petition under Section 437 / 438 / 439 / 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court Pleased to (i) Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crime No.1467 of 2025 whereby default bail has been granted to the Accused No.32 consequently ii) Quash and set aside the Official Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition,the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of order dated 06.09.2025 passed by the Spl.Court for SPE & ACB Cases, Vijayawada in Crlmp No. 1467 of 2025, till the hearing and final disposal of the present Petition and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay the operation of Office Memorandums/ Order dated 23.08.2025 passed by the Spl. Court for SPE and ACB Cases, Vijayawada and pass 5 IA NO: 3 OF 2025 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to remand Respondent/Accused 31, u/ S.309 CrPC/ S.346 BNSS till the hearing and pass Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. SPL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR CID Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. S DUSHYANTH REDDY PARA WISE INDEX Heading Paragraph Nos., within the judgment FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME 3-4 BACKGROUND FOR FILING THESE PETITIONS 5 SUBSTANCE OF THE PLEADINGS • Version of the Petitioner/State 6 • Version of the Accused No.31 7 • Version of Accused No.32 8 • Version of Accused No.33 9 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AT THE BAR • On behalf of Petitioner/State 11-23 • On behalf of Accused No.31 24-31 • On behalf of Accused No.32 32-36 • On behalf of Accused No.33 37-43 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 44 DETERMINATION BY THE COURT • Legislative History of relevant Provisions 46-62 • Key Precedents on Statutory Bail 63-74 • Key Precedents on Constituents of a Chargesheet 75-83 • Brief Overview on Contents of Police Reports 84-93 • Basis for the Impugned Orders 94 A. Some defects not cured 96-117 B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation 118-127 Sought C. Investigation pending qua other Accused 128-154 D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken 155-162 CONCLUSION 163-166 RESULT 167-169 1 This Court made the following: COMMON ORDER 1. The State filed these petitions seeking to quash the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases - cum - III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada1 in Crl.M.P.Nos.,1446, 1447 and 1467 of 2025 emanating out of Crime No.21 of 2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, whereby the Respondents/ Accused Nos.,31 to 33 were enlarged on default bail under Section 187(3)(ii) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20232 and to quash and set aside the Official Memorandums dated 23.08.2025 therein. 2. As the issues raised in these Petitions are common and challenge is to analogous impugned orders, they were heard together and are now disposed of, by this common order. The challenge in these petitions, unfold a series of legal questions concerning the scope and interpretation of BNSS provisions, in relation to default bail and completeness of a police report. Factual Background of the Crime: 3. The instant crime arises out of allegations concerning large-scale irregularities in the implementation of the excise policy and functioning of the Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited3 during 2019 to 2024. The matter came to light upon a representation made to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, on 26.08.2024 by one Venkateswara 1 For short, the learned Special Judge 2 For short, BNSS 3 For short, APSBCL 2 Rao Srinivas, alleging irregularities in the excise policy from 2019 to 2024. The report highlighted issues such as unfair discrimination in the allocation of Orders for Supply (OFS) of liquor, leading to the suppression of established brands and preferential treatment for new brands, in violation of existing norms. It also raised concerns about the shift from an automated to a manual OFS system, which could allow for manipulations. After an enquiry, Principal Secretary referred the complaint to CID Police, Mangalagiri, which registered a case in Crime No.21 of 2024 against unknown persons on 23.09.2024, alleging offences under Sections 409 , 420 , and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 18604. On 05.02.2025, the Government constituted a Special Investigation Team5, vide G.O.Rt.No.262 to investigate the alleged irregularities in the excise policy and related crimes. Following this, on 05.05.2025, Accused Nos. 31 to 33 were formally arraigned as accused in the ongoing investigation into the case. 4. Accused No. 31, the former Secretary to the Chief Minister, is alleged to have played a key role in suppressing popular liquor brands as part of a syndicate involving high-ranking officers, political authorities, and close associates of Accused No. 1. Accused No. 32, a retired Special Deputy Collector, worked as Office on Special Duty in the Chief Minister's Office during the relevant period. Accused No. 33 is alleged of being involved in a kickback scheme, collecting ill-gotten money as part of the conspiracy. 4 For short ' IPC ' 5 For short, 'SIT' 3 Background for filing these Petitions: 5. Succinctly put, the Respondents/Accused Nos., 31,32 and 33 were arrested and remanded to judicial custody, which was periodically extended from time to time. The Investigating Agency filed charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 within the statutory period of 90 days. The learned Special Judge treated the charge sheets as incomplete, and enlarged the Accused Nos., 31, 32 and 33 on default bail, vide impugned orders dated 06.09.2025. Aggrieved thereby, the State preferred these Petitions. Substance of the Pleadings before this Court: For a proper appreciation of the matter, the brief contents of the pleadings are segregated as under; 6. Version of the Petitioner/State: a. Preliminary report dated 19.07.2025 and supplementary report dated 11.08.2025 along with material documents and statements recorded during investigation are filed by the Investigating Agency within the statutory period. Accused Nos.,31 to 33 were remanded to judicial custody, the same was extended from time to time till 09.09.2025. In such a case, the Court cannot review its order of remand and grant default bail, even after filing of preliminary and final reports holding them to be incomplete. When a valid report under Section 193(3) of BNSS is filed before the Court, the right of the Accused for default bail automatically extinguishes irrespective of taking cognizance. b. Non filing of sanction order and FSL reports can never be a ground for granting default bail as they are not falling under the category of the compliance under Section 193 (6) of BNSS [corresponding to Section 173 (5) of Cr.P.C.]. 4 c. The finding of the learned trial Judge that the charge sheet was 'piecemeal' or 'incomplete' to beat the statutory time frame is erroneous; labeling a report as 'supplementary' does not change its legal validity, if it fulfills Section 193(3) of BNSS and is supported by voluminous material that was placed on record. d. Non-filing of additional copies of the charge sheet for supply to the Accused does not render it incomplete. e. The material placed on record had reflected completeness under Sections 193(3) and 193(6) of BNSS and default bail under Section 187(3) of BNSS is an exception triggered, only where no report is filed on time. When the main report under Section 193(3) of BNSS contains the prescribed particulars, annexural gaps, which are curable, do not revive default bail. Statutory compliance is achieved when the report includes all required details and accompanies documents and witness statements under Section 172 Cr.P.C. f. Police remand period under Section 167 Cr.P.C. (15 days) has been extended to 40/60 days under Section 187 BNSS. g. Under Section 193(9) BNSS, no Court permission is required for further investigation. h. The objections taken by the learned trial Judge in the Official Memorandum dated 23.08.2025, are untenable, contrary to law and the same cannot be a ground to grant default bail to the Accused. 7. Version of the Respondent / Accused No.31 a. Accused No.31 is entitled to statutory bail under Section 187 (3) (ii) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C.) as the Prosecution did not 5 choose to file a valid final report, within the statutory period. The claim made by the Investigating Agency in the supplementary report would itself indicate that the investigation is incomplete, triggering the right of the Accused to seek default bail. b. The objections raised by the learned trial Judge with regard to the non- compliance of the statutory requirements confirm that the final report is incomplete and is filed without completing the investigation within the statutory period only to defeat the indefeasible right of Accused No.31 to seek statutory bail conferred under Section 187(3) of BNSS. c. Non-compliance of the requirement of the valid charge sheet in terms of Section 193 of BNS would renders the charge sheet incomplete as the investigation is incomplete. d. The trial Judge's decision to grant statutory bail to the Accused No.31 aligns with legal principles. The report filed by the Investigating Agency lacks the essentials of Section 193 of BNSS and it does not fit into the sphere of valid report and cannot substantiate the claim of a completed investigation. e. The deficiencies pointed out by the learned trial Judge in the form of office objections cannot be construed as minor technical lapses and annexural gaps, since the issue concerns the status of the investigation and its completeness in culminating into filing of valid charge sheet. f. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 528 of BNSS is available only in cases of gross miscarriage or perversity, which are absent here. This petition, which is a disguised version of appeal for overturning the statutory bail is not maintainable. 6 g. Mere filing of a charge sheet, even if voluminous, does not equate completion of investigation. Incomplete or piecemeal charge sheets submitted to delay default bail are impermissible. h. The absence of a detailed tabular form for the siphoned amount, as mentioned in the Official Memorandum, demonstrates that the Police had not fully traced the proceeds of the crime. The fact that substantial amounts siphoned remain untraced and unrecovered supports the conclusion that the investigation is pending and the statutory bail has not been granted on this ground alone. i. The learned trial Judge has rightly observed the difference between the legal requirements under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 20026 and prosecution under IPC / The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 .7 j. The power to conduct "further investigation" under Section 193(9) of BNSS (173(8) Cr.P.C ) is meant for collecting additional evidence after completion of the investigation and filing of a charge sheet. It cannot justify an initially incomplete investigation. The Court's remand powers under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. apply only after cognizance; if the charge sheet is incomplete, the case remains pre-cognizance. 8. Version of Respondent / Accused No.32: a. On 19.07.2025, the very date on which Accused Nos. 41 to 48 were added to the present case, the preliminary charge sheet was filed against sixteen Accused. Subsequently, a supplementary charge sheet was filed against Accused 6 For short 'PMLA' 7 For short ' PC Act ' 7 Nos.,31 to 33, which also listed the same sixteen Accused. The learned trial Judge rightly concluded that even this supplementary charge sheet was defective and could not be treated as final. b. The charge sheets have been filed solely to defeat the constitutional rights of Accused No. 32. Even after the supplementary charge sheet, remand of Accused No. 32 was repeatedly obtained, solely on the pretext that the investigation remained incomplete. c. The State sought and obtained custody extensions strictly under Section 167 Cr.P.C., applicable only during investigation prior to its completion. Had the investigation been truly complete, recourse would have been under Section 309 Cr.P.C., governing custody after cognizance or commencement of trial. The State's failure to invoke Section 309 Cr.P.C. confirms that the investigation was far from complete. d. The present petition seeking quashment of the order dated 23.08.2025 is not maintainable, as the order relates only to the administrative side of the learned trial Judge. Section 528 of BNSS applies solely to judicial orders, not to administrative actions such as marking defects in a charge sheet. e. In the absence of proper investigation on material aspects, neither charge sheet complies with Section 193(5) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(3) of Cr.P.C.). Both are also defective because, out of 48 nominated Accused, the first charge sheet was filed against only 16, and the second against only three. Critical documents, including the FSL report and sanction to prosecute under Sections 17-A or 19 of the PC Act , remain unproduced. 8 f. The Investigating Agency cannot, under the pretext of further investigation, file charge sheets in a staggered manner. This undermines the right to default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., which hinges on the completion of investigation within the prescribed period, unlike Section 190 Cr.P.C. g. Filing preliminary and supplementary charge sheets in this manner constitutes a fraud on power, designed to defeat the statutory right under Section 167 Cr.P.C. for extraneous reasons. h. Formal permission of the Court is required to be obtained by the Police before conducting further investigation. Once the police report is filed, it should be capable of examination for the purpose of judicial determination to take cognizance of the offence and to proceed further into Chapter XVI Cr.P.C . and any act short of that, cannot be construed as 'taking cognizance'. i. Accused No. 32, aged approximately 67, suffers from serious respiratory ailments, including bronchiectasis, fibro-atelectatic changes, emphysematous changes with large subpleural bullae, and a history of pulmonary tuberculosis. He has been medically advised to avoid environmental triggers to prevent aggravation of his condition. Any delay in providing such safeguards could result in pneumonia, severe hypoxia, or respiratory failure, causing irreversible damage. j. As many as five preliminary reports were filed, nominating new Accused and adding fresh offences. There was no justification to arraign Accused No. 32 in the supplementary final report, as the same material was already available in the first charge sheet. A charge sheet returned for defects cannot be considered valid in law. 9 9. Version of Respondent /Accused No.33: a. This petition itself is not maintainable since it seeks to challenge an administrative order. b. It is the case of the Prosecuting Agency that the investigation was incomplete on the date of filing of the first charge sheet. As many as five preliminary reports were filed nominating new Accused persons and incorporating fresh offences. The supplementary final report dated 11.08.2025 was filed only after acknowledging that the investigation was incomplete. c. The main charge sheet does not satisfy the conditions of Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. as it consists of only 16 Accused persons and the investigation on the material offences had not been undertaken. d. The learned trial Judge did not find the investigation to be incomplete merely because documents were not annexed to the charge sheet; rather, it was held that the investigation itself was wholly defective in material particulars. e. The formal filing of a charge sheet under Section 193(3) of BNSS is not determinative. It is settled law that repeated filing of preliminary reports to circumvent statutory bail rights cannot be countenanced. f. The need for further investigation arises only upon the discovery of fresh material. There was no justification for arraigning Accused No. 33 in the supplementary final report, as the same material was already available in the first charge sheet. g. The Petitioner cannot challenge an administrative act using standards applicable to judicial functions. A charge sheet returned for defects cannot be regarded as valid in law. 10 h. Section 309 of Cr.P.C. is applicable to a stage after cognizance is taken. The learned trial Judge has only declared that it is not open to the Prosecuting Agency to extend the custody of an Accused on the basis of an incomplete charge sheet. i. Filing of piecemeal and incomplete charge sheets cannot be considered as final report. Where the investigation is admittedly incomplete and cognizance has not been taken due to substantial defects, any so-called filing of charge sheets cannot be relied upon to defeat the accrued right to default bail. j. Accused No. 33 was not included in the initial charge sheet, and no leave of the Special Court for further investigation was obtained. The subsequent filing without such permission cannot justify curtailing the liberty of default bail. k. An investigation cannot be artificially splintered to allow filing of staggered reports before a Court of competent jurisdiction. Both BNSS and Cr.P.C . mandate completion of investigation, not the mere filing of a charge sheet. l. Investigation cannot be split to file piecemeal reports before the Court. Section 173 Cr.P.C. does not contemplate partial investigations or filing incomplete charge sheets. It requires that a charge or final report be filed only after completion of the entire investigation, formation of an opinion regarding all alleged offences, and in cases involving multiple offences, after the investigation into all offences is complete. 11 Arguments advanced at the Bar: 10. Heard Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner assisted by Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor and also Sri A. Ram Dheeraj, Sri Rustonkhan and Sri P. Arora ; Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Inakollu Venkateswarlu and Sri Siddharth Sharma, learned counsel for Respondent/Accused No.33 in Crl.P. No.9363 of 2025; Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri T. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned counsel and also Sri K.Sri Sai Sanjay, Sri Paragati Nagendra Babu and Sri V. Sai Likhith appearing for Respondent/Accused No.32 in Crl.P.No.9364 of 2025 and Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy and also Sri Pradyuman Kaistha, Sri S.Uday Bhanu, Sri P.M. Mithileswara Reddy and Sri K.Mokshitha Ramakrishna, learned counsel for Respondent/Accused No.31 in Crl.P.No. 9365 of 2025. On behalf of Petitioner/State: 11. Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel representing the State in elaboration to the contentions raised in the Petitions would submit that the impugned orders of the learned Special Judge enlarging the Respondents (Accused Nos.,31, 32 and 33) on default bail under Section 187 (3) (ii) of BNSS on the ground that the Investigating Agency allegedly filed incomplete charge sheets in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 are perverse, unjustified and contrary to the settled principles of criminal law. 12. Learned Senior Counsel urged that the investigating agency filed charge sheets against the Accused named therein, which are complete and in 12 compliance of Section 193 (3) of BNSS and the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual. He further pointed out that the titles of the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 clearly state "Final Report," thereby dispelling any doubt regarding the nature of the police report. According to the learned Senior Counsel, upon verification of the charge sheets, the learned Special Judge issued two official memoranda dated 23.08.2025 to the Investigating Officer, pointing out twenty- one omissions or defects, which were identical in nature. The Investigating Officer duly complied with these observations through a memo dated 26.08.2025 and also filed Memos of Evidence 1 and 2, containing a revised, detailed, and descriptive list of witness statements recorded under Section 180 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 161 of Cr.P.C.) up to L.W.292, as well as statements under Section 183 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 164 of Cr.P.C.), along with a list of documents extending up to Volume 57, before the Special Court. It was further argued that the BNSS does not prescribe any nomenclature such as "preliminary" or "final" charge sheet. The learned Special Judge erroneously referred to the charge sheet dated 19.07.2025 as a preliminary charge sheet. When the Investigating Agency files a charge sheet in compliance with the statutory requirements under Section 193(3) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C.), it constitutes a complete charge sheet. In fact, the report was accompanied by all requisite documents and witness statements as mandated under Section 173(5) of the Cr.P.C. 13. It was further contended by learned Senior Counsel that the learned Special Judge erred in holding that the non-filing of certain FSL reports and the absence of a sanction order to prosecute Accused No. 1, a public servant, 13 amounted to the filing of an incomplete charge sheet. The absence of some FSL reports, which may be attributable to systemic delays, does not render the charge sheet incomplete. Even if such deficiencies exist, they constitute curable irregularities rather than illegalities that vitiate the charge sheet. Furthermore, once a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed period of ninety days, its return for compliance with certain procedural objections, such as obtaining a scientific expert's opinion amounts to due compliance under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. However, such procedural compliance does not confer upon the accused any right to claim statutory (default) bail. 14. Another line of argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel is that the learned Special Judge erred in holding that the charge sheet was incomplete, merely because the Investigating Agency sought permission to place additional documents and technical evidence on record. He submitted that even after filing the final report, the Investigating Agency is empowered to produce further documents and evidence before the Court in accordance with Section 193(9) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.). 15. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that all particulars required under Section 193(3) of the BNSS were duly incorporated in the charge sheet, and therefore, it cannot be termed as 'incomplete'. The objections raised in the Official Memorandum dated 23.08.2025 reflect non-application of mind, as they are untenable, contrary to law, and based on fallacious reasoning. The corrections made in compliance with the said Official Memorandum relate back to the date of filing of the original charge sheet. 14 16. Furthermore, learned Senior Counsel submitted that while examining the charge sheet for the purpose of taking cognizance under Section 210 of the BNSS, three courses of action are available to the learned Special Judge and the learned Special Judge failed to exercise these options viz., accept the report, reject the report or direct further investigation, available while issuing the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 and acted de hors the law. Although the said memoranda purported to be administrative in nature, they were issued under the signature of the learned Special Judge, clearly indicating that the learned Judge overlooked the existence of Form 69 and Rule 480-1 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual, as well as the relevant provisions of BNSS. The learned Special Judge, therefore, could not have granted default bail to the accused on the basis of the objections raised through the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025. 17. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that pendency of further investigation qua other Accused is not a ground for grant of default bail. Merely because the remand extension memos filed after filing of the charge sheet contained the grounds pertaining to further investigation on certain aspects related to the larger conspiracy, does not indicate that the investigation qua the Respondents (Accused Nos.,31, 32 and 33) is still pending or that the charge sheet is incomplete. In addition, he also submitted that further investigation can be continued even after filing of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance is not material, since filing of the charge sheet is sufficient to extinguish Section 187 (3) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C). He would thus point out that the learned Special Judge in the impugned order erred in observing 15 that, without taking cognizance of the case, remand of the Accused cannot be extended under Section 309 (2) of Cr.P.C., beyond 90 days. 18. Learned Senior Counsel further brought to the notice of the Court that even after filing of the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025, the learned Special Judge extended the remand of the Accused, observing that since two charge sheets had already been filed by the SIT, the remand was being continued. The said charge sheets were under scrutiny and pending compliance of certain office objections, and in the meantime, the Accused were remanded to judicial custody till 09.09.2025. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the extension of remand after filing of the charge sheets clearly establishes that the reports were filed within the statutory period of 90 days. Once the charge sheet is filed, the remand of the Accused can only be under Section 346 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 309 of Cr.P.C.). Therefore, when the Accused were remanded under Section 346 of BNSS, the question of claiming default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS does not arise. The moment a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed 90 days, the right of the Accused to seek default bail stands extinguished. 19. Learned Senior Counsel further also submitted that the learned Special Judge erroneously addressed only the liberty of the accused by completely overlooking the rights of the prosecution and the victim. He would state that right to free and fair investigation and trial includes maintenance of a balance between accused and prosecution rights. He also submitted that the investigating agency has every authority to produce additional documents and evidence as it may gather during further investigation. He urged that the word 16 'shall' used in Section 173 (5) Cr.P.C. is not mandatory but only directory and the Prosecution can file relevant documents even after filing the final report. 20. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out the new proviso introduced under Section 193(9) of BNSS, which mandates the Police Officer to take permission of the Magistrate to carry out further investigation during trial. It is the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the Investigating Agency is not required to take permission of the Court for carrying out further investigation as long as the trial has not commenced. He would submit that in the present case, the Investigating Agency, as a matter of transparency, apprised the Special Judge of the ongoing further investigation, even though the trial had not yet commenced. 21. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the learned Special Judge took 34 days to issue the Official Memorandum in response to the final report dated 19.07.2025 and 11 days for the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025, yet permitted only three days to comply with the raised objections. He stated that although the Investigating Officer duly filed the necessary compliances on 26.08.2025, which were reflected before the Special Court on 01.09.2025, the Special Court, without properly scrutinizing these submissions, hastily proceeded to hear the Respondents' applications and granted default bail. Furthermore, he submitted that the impugned order dated 06.09.2025 fails to refer to or consider the compliances filed by the Investigating Agency on 26.08.2025. The learned Special Judge could have exercised any of the three legally available options after the filing of the charge sheet but chose not to do so and instead granted default bail. It is well settled that the Court's inability to 17 take cognizance is not a valid ground to grant default bail, as the filing of the charge sheet and continued judicial remand extinguish the accused's right to claim such bail, irrespective of cognizance status. 22. Learned Senior Counsel would finally submit that the impugned order stating that the Investigating Agency has not complied with the defects, by placing heavy reliance on the decision in Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India and others8, is incorrect. Learned Senior Counsel brought it to the notice of the Court that, a three Judge Bench in Directorate of Enforcement v. Manpreet Singh Talwar9 clarified that a trial Court or High Court, as the case may be shall not precluded from considering an application for the grant of default bail under Section 167 of Cr.P.C., independent of and without relying on the judgment dated 26.04.2023 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.60 of 2023 i.e. Ritu Chhabaria (supra). Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the order passed by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to supra, is in force, though the review petition preferred by CBI was dismissed in Ritu Chhabaria. 23. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v. Intelligence Officer , Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,10 Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh11, Sharif Ahmad and another v. State of U.P.12 , K.Veeraswami v. Union of 8 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 502 9 Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5724/2023, dated 12.05.2023; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 751 10 (2021) 16 SCC 376 11 (2006) 6 SCC 277 12 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726 18 India13, Abdul Azeez P.V and others v. National Investigation Agency14, Judgebir (Jasbir) Singh v. NIA15 , CBI v. Kapilwadhwan16, Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand17 , Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi18 , CBI v. R.S.Pai and another19, Hemanth Dhasmana v. CBI20 , CBI v. Hemendhra Reddy and another21, Bhagwanth Singh v. Commissioner of Police and another22, Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI23 , Sanjay Dutt v. State24 , Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra25 , High Court of Delhi in Java Singh v. CBI26 , Rajneesh Kumar Singhal v. The State (NCT of Delhi )27, High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Velinedipurnam v. State of A.P.28, Venkata Ramayakota Krishnappa Raghavendra Bhuvanahalli Muniappa Nagesh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh29 and Akula Raviteja v. State of Andhra Pradesh.30 On behalf of Accused No.31: 24. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent / Accused No.31, submitted that, as evident from the evolution of law from the 13 (1991) 3 SCC 655 14 (2014) 16 SCC 543 15 (2023) 17 SCC 48 16 (2024) 3 SCC 734 17 (2024) 6 SCC 758 18 (2023) 15 SCC 311 19 (2002) 5 SCC 582 20 (2001) 7 SCC 536 21 (2023) 16 SCC 779 22 (1985) 2 SCC 537 23 (2007) 8 SCC 770 24 (1994) 5 SCC 410 25 (2013) 3 SCC 77 26 2000 SCC OnLine Del 1336 27 2000 SCC OnLine Del 911 28 1993 SCC OnLine AP 260 29 2009 SCC OnLine AP 264 30 2020 SCC OnLine AP 1464 19 Cr.P.C ., 1898, through the recommendations of the Law Commission, to the enactment of the Cr.P.C ., 1973, and now the BNSS, 2023, the legislature has consistently accorded paramount importance to the personal liberty of an individual. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that there is no prohibition to continue the investigation after the statutory period of 60 / 90 days and the right under Section 187 of BNSS is triggered upon failure to complete the investigation. He argued that the question as to whether the Investigating Officer filed charge sheet to defeat the right of an Accused to default bail would be a question of fact. 25. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the judgment relied upon by the State in Kapil Wadhwan (supra) cannot be construed to mean that the Court is bound to mechanically accept the filing of a charge sheet as conclusive proof of completion of investigation, without exercising its judicial discretion. In the present case, the Investigating Agency is alleged to have misled the Court by filing the charge sheet on 19.07.2025, despite the fact that Accused Nos. 31 to 33 had been in custody and available for investigation for nearly two months prior to that date, yet no charge sheet was filed against them during that period. It is evident that the Investigating Officer was fully aware that further investigation was being undertaken and that, in such circumstances, permission of the Court was required to proceed, thereby indicating procedural impropriety on the part of the Investigating Agency. 26. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the test for default bail is not whether charge sheet has been filed, rather, it is whether the investigation is completed within the prescribed time. He would submit that the 20 learned Special Judge applied this test and on facts held that, investigation is not completed. Learned Senior Counsel elaborated further that the charge sheet must be valid in the eye of law to continue the custody of the Respondent beyond the statutory period. It is further represented that supplementary report based on a material which is already available fails to satisfy Section 193 (9) of BNSS as it has to be in relation to fresh information after filing the final report. He also submitted that if any doubt arises regarding the nature of the charge sheet, Court has to lean towards the Accused. 27. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, when charge sheet is filed only for certain offences, the charge sheet is considered to be incomplete and piece-meal. He would submit that an in-depth review of charge sheets cannot be conducted by the High Court. He would point out that the remand extension memos filed subsequent to the submission of the supplementary charge sheet clearly indicate that the investigation is still at a nascent stage, as they emphasize need for continued custodial interrogation and confrontation of the Accused with the recovered material. This according to learned Senior Counsel demonstrates that the investigation remains incomplete, even with respect to Accused No. 31, thereby undermining the contention of Investigating Agency that the investigation had reached its conclusion at the time of filing the charge sheet. 28. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the manner in which the investigation has been conducted clearly reflects that it is politically motivated and tainted with mala fides. He submitted that the State must justify the filing of multiple charge sheets against different accused persons, as such splitting 21 and piecemeal filing appear to be deliberate attempts to frustrate the accused's statutory right to default bail. The supplementary charge sheet filed against Respondent / Accused No. 31 is based on material allegedly gathered after the first charge sheet, yet the pattern indicates an intention to prolong custody rather than a genuine progression of investigation. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, once cognizance is taken, Court cannot undo it and as per the memo filed by the Prosecution dated 13.08.2025 investigation qua Accused No.31 is continuing, when it is a case of conspiracy, the case cannot be separated. 29. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Investigating Officer failed to comply with Form 69 of the A.P. Police Rules, as there is no clarity regarding persons not charge-sheeted. According to the A.P. Police Manual, an incomplete charge sheet cannot be filed merely to keep the accused in custody. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that Section 193(9) BNSS cannot substitute for an original, complete charge sheet; only genuinely new material discovered later justifies further investigation. He would also contend that even for further investigation, permission of the Court is essential. He further stated that under Section 346 BNSS, the Court cannot remand an accused until cognizance of the offence is taken. It is also argued that if the official memorandum dated 23.08.2025 is treated as a judicial order, the failure to challenge it before the grant of default bail would imply that no valid charge sheet existed in law. Since the Magistrate had returned the charge sheet before the expiry of the statutory period, at the time of the default bail application, 22 there was effectively no charge sheet or material under Section 173 BNSS before the Court for consideration. 30. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the order passed by a three Judge Bench in Manpreet Singh Talwar (supra), directing the trial Courts and High Courts to take independent decision on the point of default bail without reference to the decision in Ritu Chhabaria (supra) is purely a temporary arrangement. 31. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri S. Niranjan Reddy has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mariam Fasihuddin and another v. State of Karnataka31 , Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others32, Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam33, Dinesh Dalmia (supra), Kapil Wadhwan (supra), Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and others34, High Court of Delhi in Chitra Rama Krishna vs. CBI35 . On behalf of Accused No.32: 32. Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Accused No. 32, submitted that this Court possesses inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS to act ex debito justitiae and to secure the ends of justice and the judgments relied upon by the State cannot restrict or predetermine the Court's independent assessment of the matter. He stated that the Respondent / Accused No. 32, a retired Special Deputy Collector who served as Officer on Special Duty 31 (2024) 11 SCC 733 32 (1994) 4 SCC 602 33 (2017) 15 SCC 67 34 (2013) 5 SCC 762 35 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3124 23 (OSD) in the Chief Minister's Office, was arrested on 16.05.2025 and remanded to judicial custody on 17.05.2025. 33. Learned Senior Counsel stated that the investigating agency filed a preliminary charge sheet on 19.07.2025 against sixteen persons and supplementary charge sheet on 11.08.2025 against three persons including Accused No.32 and the period of 90 days in case of Accused No.32 expired on 17.08.2025. He contended that the supplementary charge sheet was filed without completing the investigation, only to defeat an indefeasible right of default bail of the Accused. 34. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the right to default bail exhausts only when the investigation is completed i.e., when it is brought to an end. In the present case, the investigation remains incomplete, and therefore the embargo under Section 187 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 167 Cr.P.C.) continues to apply. While Section 167 Cr.P.C. prescribes limits on police and judicial custody i.e., 15 days for police and 60/90 days for judicial custody, it does not fix a maximum period for completion of investigation; if the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period, the Magistrate has no option but to release the accused on bail if they are willing. 35. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that filing a report under Section 193 of BNSS is not a mere formality; it is meant to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 210 of BNSS. Filing an incomplete charge sheet to defeat the accused's statutory right to default bail is contrary to law. He contended that in the present case, the learned Special Judge identified serious defects in the charge sheet filed by the State and, after providing opportunity 24 for compliance, rightly granted default bail to Respondent/Accused No. 32. Authority to conduct further investigation cannot be used as a tool to deny default bail. Further investigation refers to the discovery of fresh material after filing the initial report; a preliminary charge sheet cannot be treated as evidence of a completed investigation under Sections 190 and 193 BNSS. The judgments relating to UAPA, NDPS and TADA Acts are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel finally submitted that the learned Special Judge clearly observed in the order that the charge sheet is incomplete and it is filed only to defeat the rights of the Accused for default bail. 36. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddhartha Dave, placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Judgebir Singh (supra), CBI v. Rathin Dandapat36 , Achpal v. State of Rajasthan37 Kapil Wadhwan (supra), K.Veeraswami (supra), Ritu Chhabaria (supra), State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre38 , Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar39 , Dinesh Dalmi supra, M.Ravindran (supra), Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh40 High Court of Delhi in Avinash Jain v. CBI41, High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Akula Ravi Teja (supra), M.China Venkatareddy & Ors. v. State of A.P.42, High Court for the State of Telangana in C. Parthasarthy (supra), High Court of Delhi in Chitra Ramakrishna (supra), Ram Kishore Arora 36 (2016) 1 SCC 507 37 (2019) 14 SCC 599 38 (1995) 1 SCC 42 39 (2009) 6 SCC 346 40 (2021) 20 SCC 636 41 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2946 42 1993 SCC OnLine AP 66 25 v. Directorate of Enforcement and Anr.,43 Tunde Gbaja v. CBI44, Hari Chand v. State of Delhi45 High Court of Madras in Nagarajan and Anr. v. State of Tamilnadu,46 High Court of Kerala in S.M. Furtado v. CBI & Ors.47, High Court of Punjab & Haryana in State of Haryana v. Mehal Singh and Anr.48 On behalf of Accused No.33 37. Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent/ Accused No.33 would submit that, Accused No.33 is not a public servant. The purpose of filing a charge sheet after completion of investigation is to enable the Court to inquire into the matter. Respondent/Accused No.33 was remanded to judicial custody on 14.05.2025. The learned Special Judge cannot extend the judicial custody beyond the 90th day unless, he can inquire into the matter on the basis of a charge sheet which is filed. It is further submitted that, the 90th day of such judicial custody of Accused No.33 expired on 11.08.2025. The said report filed by the Investigating Agency was not in accordance with Section 193 (3) of BNSS, and thereby, the learned Special Judge could not inquire into the matter. The investigating agency filed its report in complete form only on 01.09.2025. However, on 26.08.2025 the Respondent / Accused No.33 filed an application for default bail. The learned Special Judge has rightly not considered such compliance in the impugned order. The judgment in the case 43 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1631 44 2007 SCC OnLine Del 450 45 1974 SCC OnLine Del 98 46 2003 SCC OnLine Mad 1165 47 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 112 48 1978 SCC OnLine P&H 117 26 of Kapil Wadhwan (supra) is not helpful to the case of the Prosecution. In the said case, the Court took cognizance of the offence and investigation was pending for some other Accused and the default bail was granted on the ground that the investigation was pending against the remaining Accused. Hence, the judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the learned Special Judge could not take cognizance in this matter. 38. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that an indefeasible right to be enlarged on default bail had accrued in favour of Accused No.33, which cannot be defeated by a subsequent filing of final report by the Investigating Agency. The right to be released on default bail on the failure of the Investigating Agency to complete the investigation within 90 days is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The 90th day is expired on 12.08.2025. The right which had accrued to the Accused by filing a petition on 26.08.2025 sought to be defeated by relying upon the compliance on 01.09.2025 which is impermissible in law. The Constitutional Courts have consistently taken a view that, when two views are possible, one in favour of the liberty of the Accused and the other which ensures continued incarceration of the Accused, the Courts are required to take the view that favours the liberty of the Accused. The Investigating Agency has filed a charge sheet only to defeat a valuable right of Accused No.33. The investigation has been person-centric but not offence-centric as it failed to disclose full particulars of the offence. 39. Learned Senior Counsel further stated that Accused Nos.1 to 29 were brought on record by a memo dated 22.04.2025 and Accused Nos.31 to 33 27 on 05.05.2025. Yet, the initial charge sheet is filed against sixteen Accused and the second charge sheet is filed on 11.08.2025 named against Accused Nos.31 to 33. Neither charge sheet satisfies the requirement of completion of investigation under Section 190 and 193(2) of BNSS. The tenor of filing piece-meal charge sheets against particular Accused is only to deprive them of their statutory right. He further stated that the Investigating Agency filed remand extension memos before the Court from time to time, which would establish that continued detention of the Accused was sought to facilitate investigation. The remand extension memos filed either prior or subsequent to the filing of the incomplete charge sheets, explicitly show that the investigation into the offences is still in progress. Further investigation presupposes that the primary investigation has concluded with a final report and that the Court can take cognizance. 40. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that the Investigating Agency never stated that the investigation qua the offences alleged against Accused No.33 had concluded to enable the Special Court to take cognizance. As the investigation remains on going, it cannot be said as further investigation but it is a continuing investigation. The remand of an Accused under Section 346 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 309 Cr.P.C.) arises only after taking cognizance. Learned Special Judge has noted in the proceedings dated 26.08.2025 that the learned Special Public Prosecutor sought extension of remand stating that, some more witnesses have to be examined and material witness evidence i.e., documentary and technical was yet to be collected from various sources. 28 41. Learned Senior Counsel sternly argued that the contention of the State that the Accused were remanded to judicial custody under Section 346 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 309 Cr.P.C) is misconceived and is liable to be rejected. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Investigating Officer himself mentioned in the remand extension memos that the investigation is still in progress. As such, the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 cannot be considered as final reports within the meaning of Section 190 of BNSS and they are incomplete or piece-meal reports. It is submitted that the judgments are precedents for what they actually decided and not for what logically follows from them and a judgment has to be understood in the context of its facts. 42. Learned Senior counsel also stated that filing of FSL report along with charge sheet is mandatory for compliance of Section 193 (3) BNSS and the matter is now referred to a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel finally submitted that, they are not relying on Ritu Chhabaria (supra), since a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed order not to rely on the said judgment . He finally submitted that it is a settled law that the indefeasible right under Section 187 of BNSS accrues to an accused, when incomplete charge sheet filed only to scuttle the right of an Accused for default bail. 43. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri T. Niranjan Reddy placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and others49, Aslam Babalal 49 (2010) 12 SCC 254 29 Desai v. State of Maharashtra50 , Bharath Petroleum Corporation v. N.R.Vairamani and another51, Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v. State of Maharashtra52 , Vijay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak and others,53 Peethambaran v. State of Kerala and another,54 Sharif Ahmed and another v. State of U.P and another55, M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence56, Suresh Kumar Bikamchand (supra), High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.V. Sarma v. Smt.Turgakamala Devi and others57, Bandi Kotayya v. State58, Akula Ravi Teja (supra), and High Court for the State of Telangana in C. Parthasarthy v. State.59 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION : 44. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions made and perused the material on record. On such exercise, the issues falling for consideration before this Court, are as follows; a. Whether an Accused is entitled to default bail under proviso to Section 187 (3)(ii) of BNSS when the chargesheet, though filed within the statutory period, is returned on certain defects, which are subsequently complied? 50 (1992) 4 SCC 272 51 (2004) 8 SCC 579 52 (2008) 1 SCC 494 53 (2013) 5SCC 762 54 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553 55 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726 56 (2021) 2 SCC 485 57 1975 SCC OnLine AP 71 58 AIR 1966 AP 377 59 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1075 30 b. Whether mere permission seeking further investigation would make the investigation incomplete and consequently the chargesheet incomplete for the purposes of default bail under proviso to Section 187(3)(ii) of the BNSS? c. Whether taking cognizance of the case is precondition for extending remand of an Accused after the filing of the charge sheet within the statutory period, and whether the Court's inability to take cognizance can be a ground for default bail? d. Whether the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 and the official memorandum dated 23.08.2025 are liable to be quashed? DETERMINATION BY THE COURT: 45. A perusal of Sec. 528 BNSS (corresponding to Sec. 482 Cr. P.C.) makes it clear that BNSS envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Sanhita or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in inherent jurisdiction must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. Legislative History of the relevant Provisions 46. The concept of 'default bail', enabled in the criminal procedural jurisprudence, reflects an equilibrium between investigative efficiency and 31 individual liberty. Before going forward with the analysis on the present cases, it is essential to refer to the historical background of the legal provisions. 47. Section 58 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 57 of Cr.P.C.) clarifies that no Police Officer shall detain any arrested person in custody more than 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate Court, irrespective of jurisdiction. If the Investigating Officer failed to complete the investigation within 24 hours of the said arrest, he shall produce the person before the Court seeking some time to complete the investigation, Section 187 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 167 of Cr.P.C.) takes care of such a situation. The Sections are tabulated hereinunder; Cr.P.C . BNSS 57. Person arrested not to be 58. Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-four detained more than twenty-four hours.-- hours.-- No police officer shall detain in No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special shall not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under Section order of a Magistrate under Section 167, exceed twenty-four hours 187, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court. Magistrate's Court, whether having jurisdiction or not. 48. The historical background of Section 187 BNSS as it stands now starts from the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure . Section 167 of Cr.P.C, 1898 provided for conclusion of investigations within twenty-four hours or within 15 days at 32 the maximum, regardless of the nature of the offence or the punishment. The provision reads as follows; "Section 167 -Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours ***** (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction...." 49. In relation to the above provision in Cr.P.C , 1898, the Law Commission of India, in its 41st Report, noted that complex investigations are often not completed within 15 days. In such cases, the police seek custody by filing a preliminary or incomplete report, and the Magistrate then uses Section 344 to extend custody, even though the Law Commission, in its 14th Report, had stated that Section 344 should apply only after a final report under Section 173 is filed. It was observed that using Section 344 to bypass the limits of Section 167 would lead to misuse allowing prolonged detention while investigation goes slow. Therefore, as in the earlier Law Commission (14th Report), the maximum period under Section 167 at 60 days was proposed in the 41st Report also. 50. The recommendations of the Law Commission of India were carefully examined and accepted, as reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 07.11.1970 for introducing the new Cr.P.C , 1973. The Government considered, among other factors, that an accused person should 33 receive a fair trial based on the principles of natural justice, that delays in investigation and trial should be avoided as they harm both individuals and society, and that the procedure should remain simple and ensure fairness, particularly for the poorer sections of the community. Consequently, Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, was enacted with the recommended time limit, applicable irrespective of the nature of the offence or the punishment, which reads thus; "Section 167 -Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours ***** (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole: and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that (a) the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exists for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixty days, and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;" 34 51. Thereafter in 1978, it was felt that Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., required amendment, not only to extend the period for completing investigations but also to link the same to the seriousness of the alleged offence. As a result, it was proposed that an aggregate period of 90 days be allowed for investigations in cases involving offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for not less than ten years, and up to 60 days in all other cases. 52. Section 187 of BNSS corresponds to Section 167 of Cr.P.C. and is on similar footing so far as the instant issue of statutory bail stands. Section 187 (3) corresponds to Section 167(2) of the CrPC, and forms the crux of the present case. 53. It is pertinent to mention that, a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in V. Senthil Balaji v. State,60 directed the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India to decide whether the police can seek police custody only during the first 15 days after the accused is remanded, or whether that 15-day period can be used at any time during the entire investigation period of 60 or 90 days. The BNSS resolves this ambiguity by Section 187(2). It clearly states that the Magistrate may authorize police custody "for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole, or in parts, at any time during the initial forty days or sixty days" (depending on whether the total remand period is 60 or 90 days). 60 (2024) 3 SCC 51 35 54. Relevant extracts of the provision from Cr.P.C . and BNSS for the present issue are tabulated hereinunder; Cr. P. C. BNSS Section 167: Section 187: Procedure when investigation Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty- cannot be completed in twenty- four hours. four hours (2) The Magistrate to whom (3) The Magistrate may an accused person is forwarded authorise the detention of the under this section may, whether he accused person, beyond the period has or has not jurisdiction to try of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that the case, from time to time, adequate grounds exist for doing authorise the detention of the so, but no Magistrate shall accused in such custody as such authorise the detention of the Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not accused person in custody under exceeding fifteen days in the this sub-section for a total period whole; and if he has no jurisdiction exceeding-- to try the case or commit it for trial, (i) ninety days, where the and considers further detention investigation relates to an unnecessary, he may order the offence punishable with death, accused to be forwarded to a imprisonment for life or Magistrate having such imprisonment for a term of ten jurisdiction: years or more; Provided that-- (ii) sixty days, where the (a) the Magistrate may investigation relates to any authorise the detention of the other offence, accused person, otherwise than in and, on the expiry of the said period custody of the police, beyond the of ninety days, or sixty days, as the period of fifteen days, if he is case may be, the accused person satisfied that adequate grounds shall be released on bail if he is exist for doing so, but no prepared to and does furnish bail, Magistrate shall authorise the and every person released on bail detention of the accused person in under this sub-section shall be custody under this paragraph for a deemed to be so released under the total period exceeding provisions of Chapter XXXV for the (i) ninety days, where the purposes of that Chapter. investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or 36 imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; ..... 55. Therefore, on a whole, the legislative intent has consistently been to ensure that investigations are completed within 24 hours, and if not, then within 15 days under the 1898 Cr.P.C . This limit was later extended to 60 days under Cr.P.C ., 1973 and eventually to 90 days for offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of at least 10 years, while the 60-day limit continued for all other offences, as is brought in by the 1978 Amendment and followed in the BNSS. The importance of these 60- and 90-day periods is that if the investigation is not completed and no charge sheet is filed within the applicable time, the accused in custody becomes entitled to 'default' bail, provided he is prepared to and does furnish bail. 56. It must be emphasized that the paramount consideration of the legislature while enacting Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. and the proviso thereto/ Section 187 BNSS was that the investigation must be completed expeditiously, 37 and that the accused should not be detained for an unreasonably long period as was the situation prevailing under the 1898 Code. This would be in consonance with the obligation cast upon the State under Article 21 to follow a fair, just and reasonable procedure prior to depriving any person of his personal liberty. 57. "Investigation" as defined in Section 2(l) of the BNSS includes all the proceedings under BNSS for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in H. N. Rishbud and Anr. v. State of Delhi61 categorized the steps involved in an investigation as follows; "....investigation consists generally of the following steps:(1) Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under section 173." (emphasis supplied) 58. Sec.193 (1) BNSS (corresponding to Sec.173 (1) Cr.P.C.) enjoins that the investigation must be completed without 'unreasonable delay'. 61 1955 SCR (1)1150 38 Relevant extracts of these two provisions for the instant case are tabulated hereunder; (Emphasized portion indicates change) Cr. P. C. BNSS Section 173 Section 193 Report of police officer on Report of police officer on completion of investigation completion of investigation (1) Every investigation under this (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay. unnecessary delay. (2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the (3) (i) As soon as the investigation is officer in charge of the police station completed, the officer in charge of the shall forward to a Magistrate police station shall forward, empowered to take cognizance of the including through electronic offence on a police report, a report in communication to a Magistrate the form prescribed by the State empowered to take cognizance of the Government, stating-- offence on a police report, a report in the form as the State Government (a) the names of the parties; may, by rules provide, stating-- (b) the nature of the information; (a) the names of the parties; (c) the names of the persons who (b) the nature of the information; appear to be acquainted with the (c) the names of the persons who circumstances of the case; appear to be acquainted with the (d) whether any offence appears circumstances of the case; to have been committed and, if (d) whether any offence appears to so, by whom; have been committed and, if so, by (e) whether the accused has been whom; arrested; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released (f) whether the accused has been on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; released on his bond or bail bond; (g) whether the accused has been (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under forwarded in custody under Section 170; Section 190; (h) whether the report of medical (h) whether the report of examination of the woman has medical examination of the been attached where investigation woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence relates to an offence under Sections under Sections 376, Section 376- 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 or Section 71 A, Section 376-AB, Section 376- 39 B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB 2023; or Section 376-E of the Indian (i) the sequence of custody in Penal Code. case of electronic device; (ii) The officer shall also (ii) the police officer shall, within communicate, in such manner as a period of ninety days, inform may be prescribed by the State the progress of the investigation Government, the action taken by him by any means including through to the person, if any, by whom the electronic communication to the information relating to the informant or the victim; commission of the offence was first (iii) the officer shall also given. communicate, in such manner as the State Government may, by rules, provide, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (5) When such report is in respect (6) When such report is in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies, of a case to which Section 190 applies, the police officer shall forward to the the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report-- Magistrate along with the report-- (a) all documents or relevant (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other prosecution proposes to rely than those already sent to the other than those already sent to Magistrate during investigation; the Magistrate during (b) the statements recorded under investigation; Section 180 of all the persons (b) the statements recorded whom the prosecution proposes to under Section 161 of all the examine as its witnesses. persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (8) Nothing in this section shall be (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) after a report under sub-section (3) has been forwarded to the Magistrate has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, and, where upon such investigation, 40 the officer in charge of the police the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in reports regarding such evidence in the the form prescribed; and the form as the State Government may, by provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) rules, provide; and the provisions of shall, as far as may be, apply in sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as relation to such report or reports as may be, apply in relation to such they apply in relation to a report report or reports as they apply in forwarded under sub-section (2). relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (3): Provided that further investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and the same shall be completed within a period of ninety days which may be extended with the permission of the Court. 59. Section 193(3) of BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.) mandates that once investigation is completed, the Officer in charge of the Police Station shall forward, a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, including electronically (inserted by BNSS). The report must be in the format prescribed by the State Government and must state the required details as contained in the sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Section 193 (3)(i). In addition to the requirements as provided in Section 173 (2), the BNSS introduced the sequence of custody in case of electronic device, vide sub-clause (i). Further, vide the newly inserted Section 193 (3)(ii), the police officer must inform the informant or the victim about the progress of the investigation within 90 days, using any means, including electronic communication. 41 60. Section 193 (6) of BNSS mandates when such report is in respect of a case to which Section 190 of BNSS applies, the Police Officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the Prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation and the statements recorded under Section 180 of BNSS of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. Subsection (8) of 193 Cr.P.C . is newly inserted, which mandates the police officer investigating the case to submit such number of copies of police report for supply to the accused, including by electronic communication. 61. Section 193(9) of BNSS, like Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C., allows the police to conduct further investigation even after submitting the initial report to the Magistrate and requires that any new oral or documentary evidence be forwarded through a supplementary report to which the same procedural rules apply. However, the BNSS adds a new proviso stating that further investigation during trial may be carried out only with the Court's permission and must be completed within ninety days, thereafter extendable with the Court's approval. 62. So far as to identify the trend of application of legal provisions supra, it is essential to primarily deal with few judicial pronouncements. Key Precedents on Statutory Bail 63. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, in a line of precedents categorically held that an indefeasible right accrues to an accused when the prosecution fails to file a charge-sheet within the period prescribed under the proviso to Section 167(2) of the CrPC, provided that the accused is 42 ready to and does, in fact, furnishes bail. Right to default bail is not merely a statutory entitlement under the proviso to Section 167(2) of CrPC, but forms an integral part of the "procedure established by law" as under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, thereby elevating it to the status of a fundamental right of an accused, provided that the conditions stipulated are fulfilled. Explaining this principle of law, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab62 held as follows: "36. ...A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted. 37. ..... The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled. ..." (emphasis supplied) 64. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Dutt (supra) answered questions concerning the proper construction of Section 62 2020 SCC OnLine SC 824 43 20 (4) (bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 198763 indicating the nature of right of an accused to be released on bail thereunder. Under TADA, the normal 90-day or 60-day limit as in Section 167 CrPC is modified to the extent that the investigation must be finished within 180 days for the offences under the said Act. If the police cannot finish in 180 days, the Designated Court may extend the time up to 1 year, but only if the Public Prosecutor submits a report explaining the progress of the investigation and giving specific reasons why the accused must remain in custody longer. This gives rise to the right of the accused to be released on default bail on expiry of 180 days or the extended period on default to complete the investigation within the time allowed. At para 48, the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the reference as follows; "53... (2)(b) The "indefeasible right" of the accused to be released on bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The right of the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan, 63 For short, TADA 44 notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable at that stage." (emphasis supplied) 65. In Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra 64, the accused, booked under Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishment) Act, 1999,65 surrendered on 17.6.2000 and the 60 day period for filing chargesheet expired on 16.8.2000. He applied for default bail on 17.8.2000, but the Magistrate rejected it on the ground that Section 167(2) did not apply to MPID Act offences. The High Court later held that Section 167(2) does apply, but refused bail because the chargesheet had been filed on 30.8.2000, a day before the matter was heard on 31.8.2000. Relying on Sanjay Dutt (supra), the High Court held that the right to default bail does not survive once a charge-sheet is filed before the bail claim is decided. In this context, a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Sections 57 and proviso to Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. are in consonance with the constitutional mandate of Article 22 (2) and that the statutory bail under Section 167 (2) proviso is a beneficial provision for curing the mischief of indefinitely prolonging the investigation which affects the liberty of a citizen. The following conclusions were culled out; "1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. 64 (2001) 5 SCC 453 65 For short, MPID Act 45 2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub- section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. 3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate. 4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/ court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated. 5. If the accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the accused even beyond the specified period in para (a) will not be unauthorised, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the accused would stand extinguished. 6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] must be understood to mean when the accused 46 files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same" (emphasis supplied) 66. The appeal preferred was allowed as according to the majority in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra), the accused's right to default bail had already been availed of on 17.8.2000, when he filed an application offering to furnish bail after the statutory period expired and the Magistrate wrongly rejected the plea. It was ruled that although the charge-sheet was later filed during proceedings in the High Court, it did not extinguish the right. However, by way of minority judgment in Uday Mohanlal Acharya (supra), view was taken that the right is availed only after the accused actually furnishes the bail bond, not merely on filing the application. 67. In M.Ravindran (supra), the issue that arose was whether the indefeasible right accruing to the appellant under Section 167(2) , CrPC gets extinguished by subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the investigating agency. It was decided that the filing of an additional complaint after the accused has availed his right to be released on default bail, should not deter the courts from enforcing this indefeasible right, if the charge-sheet was not filed before the expiry of the statutory period. The following guidelines were culled out; 47 "18.1 Once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have 'availed of' or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) , CrPC read with Section 36A (4) , NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency. 18.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court. 18.3 However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC . 18.4 Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid." 48 68. In Achpal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled principal concerning statutory bail as follows; "12. The principles laid down in Uday Mohanlal Acharya have been consistently followed by this Court, namely, in State of W.B. v. Dinesh Dalmia ; Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau ; Union of India v. Nirala Yadav and in Rambeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Rambeer Shokeen v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 4 SCC 405 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 498] . It must therefore be taken to be well settled that in terms of 3rd conclusion as recorded in Uday Mohanlal Acharya, on the expiry of the period stipulated, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period stipulated and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate." (emphasis supplied) 69. In Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra,66 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court right held that the right to statutory bail under proviso to Section 167 (2) cannot be defeated by any court, if the accused concerned is prepared and does furnish bail bonds to the satisfaction of the court concerned. The relevant extract reads; "If an accused charged with any kind of offence becomes entitled to be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2), that statutory right should not be defeated by keeping the applications pending till the charge-sheets are submitted so that the right which had accrued is extinguished and defeated." 66 (1996) 1 SCC 722 49 70. In Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), a three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, dealt with the interpretation of the phrase "punishable with imprisonment for not less than 10 years" which occurs in Section 167(2) for determining whether the permissible period of custody is 60 days or 90 days in relation to the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) of the PC Act. While emphasizing on the duty of the courts in matters concerning personal liberty and penal statutes, observed thus; "44.....Strong words indeed. That being so we are of the clear opinion that adapting this principle, it would equally be the duty and responsibility of a court on coming to know that the accused person before it is entitled to "default bail", to at least apprise him or her of the indefeasible right. A contrary view would diminish the respect for personal liberty, on which so much emphasis has been laid by this Court as is evidenced by the decisions mentioned above, and also adverted to in Nirala Yadav." (emphasis supplied) 71. In Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI , terming the indefeasible right to 67 statutory bail under Section 167 (2) as an integral part of the right to personal liberty under Art 21, it was observed thus; "41. As a consequence of the right flowing from the said provision, courts will have to give due effect to it, and thus any detention beyond this period would certainly be illegal, being an affront to the liberty of the person concerned. Therefore, it is not only the duty of the investigating agency but also the courts to see to it that an accused gets the benefit of Section 167(2)." (emphasis supplied) 67 (2022) 10 SCC 51 50 72. In Dinesh Dalmia (supra), interpretation of Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis Section 309 (2) of Cr.P.C. fell for consideration. With regard to the scope of statutory bail, it was observed as follows; "25. Such a right of bail although is a valuable right but the same is a conditional one; the condition precedent being pendency of the investigation. Whether an investigation in fact has remained pending and the investigating officer has submitted the charge- sheet only with a view to curtail the right of the accused would essentially be a question of fact..... " (emphasis supplied) 73. In light of the provisions of the BNSS, along with the precedents discussed above, it is clear that when an accused is arrested, during the course of an investigation, the accused must be produced before the Magistrate if the investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours of the arrest, so that the Magistrate may authorise custody. At this stage, under Section 187 of the BNSS, the Magistrate is empowered to remand the accused to police or judicial custody for up to 15 days, subject to a maximum of 60 or 90 days, depending on the nature of the case. If the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within the prescribed period, the accused becomes entitled to statutory bail. In other words, if the investigation is not completed and the police report is not filed within the statutory period, the consequence is that the accused must be released on default bail, provided he is willing to furnish bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate. 74. The underlying object of Section 187(3)(i) BNSS thus appears to be to caution investigating officers to complete investigations promptly, failing which 51 the accused must be released on default bail. At the same time, this provision protects the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution by preventing indefinite incarceration, whether at the pre-cognizance or post- cognizance stage, before the accused's guilt is established. Key Precedents on Constituents of a Chargesheet 75. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami (supra), dealt with a question whether a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Judge of a High Court is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2 of the PC Act, 1947 and can be bought within the purview of Section 6(1) (c) of the Act or not. As the legality of the chargesheet was also challenged, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus; "76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police officer under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. The Section 173(2) provides that on completion of the investigation the police officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a report. The report must be in the form prescribed by the State Government and stating therein (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he had been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; and (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. As observed by this Court in Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Bihar , that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is an intimation to the magistrate that upon investigation into a cognizable offence the Investigating Officer has been able to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into 52 the offence and the necessary information is being sent to the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2) purports to be an opinion of the Investigating Officer that as far as he is concerned he has been able to procure sufficient material for the trial of the accused by the court. The report is complete if it is accompanied with all the documents and statements of witnesses as required by Section 175(5). Nothing more need be stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. It is also not necessary that all the details of the offence must be stated. The details of the offence are required to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused at a later stage i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing acceptable evidence." (emphasis supplied) 76. In the context of the facts in K. Veeraswami (supra), it was observed by the Constitution Bench that the charge sheet met all the requirements of Section 173(2) CrPC as it clearly stated that, during the relevant period, the appellant possessed assets both in his own name and in the names of his family members disproportionate to his known income by ₹6,41,416.36 and could not account for them. The details of these assets were fully set out, and nothing more was required under the law. 77. In Dablu Kujur (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having examined the importance of a complete police report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC, emphasized that the investigating officer must strictly comply with the statutory requirements while submitting a chargesheet, noting the variant practices and defaults in states. "6. The police report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) CrPC being very important piece of document from the viewpoint of the prosecution, the defence and the court, we 53 deem it necessary to elaborately deal with the various aspects involved in the said provision. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we are of the opinion that it is incumbent on the part of the investigating officer to strictly comply with the requirements of the said provisions, as non-compliance thereof gives rise to many legal issues in the court of law. ***** 13. We are more concerned with Section 173(2) as we have found that the investigating officers while submitting the charge-sheet/police report do not comply with the requirements of the said provision. Though it is true that the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual to be followed by the police officers while discharging their duty, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the police report/charge-sheet are laid down in Section 173, more particularly sub-section (2) thereof. 14. It may be noted that though there are various reports required to be submitted by the police in charge of the police station before, during and after the investigation as contemplated in Chapter XII CrPC , it is only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under sub- section (2) of Section 173CrPC that can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A charge- sheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) CrPC. It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the court concerned that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. 15. When such a police report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, 54 (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub- section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such police report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156 [Bhagwant Singh v. CBI, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] . **** 20. Ergo, having regard to the provisions contained in Section 173 it is hereby directed that the report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain the following: 20.1. A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating-- (a) The names of the parties; (b) The nature of the information; (c) The names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) Whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) Whether the accused has been arrested; (f) Whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) Whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [Sections 376, 376-A, 376-AB, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D, 376-DA, 376-DB or Section 376-E of the Penal Code (45 of 1860)] 20.2. If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify 55 the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the police officer in charge shall clearly state in the report about the compliance of Section 169CrPC. 20.3. When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. 20.4. In case of further investigation, the police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub- paras 20.1 to 20.3." (emphasis supplied) 78. In Sharif Ahmed (supra), a two Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with an appeal arising out of quashment of chargesheet had observed as follows by placing reliance on the decision of the Constitution bench in K. Veeraswami (supra); "13. The question of the required details being complete must be understood in a way which gives effect to the true intent of the charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code. The requirement of "further evidence" or a "supplementary charge-sheet" as referred to under Section 173(8) of the Code, is to make additions to a complete charge-sheet, [ State v. Hemendhra Reddy , (2023) 16 SCC 779] and not to make up or reparate for a charge-sheet which does not fulfil requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. The charge- sheet is complete when it refers to material and evidence sufficient to take cognizance and for the trial. The nature and standard of evidence to be elucidated in a charge-sheet should prima facie show that an offence is established if the material and evidence is proven. The charge-sheet is complete where a case is not exclusively dependent on further evidence. The trial can proceed on the basis of 56 evidence and material placed on record with the charge- sheet. This standard is not overly technical or foolproof, but a pragmatic balance to protect the innocent from harassment due to delay as well as prolonged incarceration, and yet not curtail the right of the prosecution to forward further evidence in support of the charges [See also, para 22 below on the power of the police to investigate under Section 173(8) of the Code.] . **** 25. It is the police report which would enable the Magistrate to decide a course of action from the options available to him. The details of the offence and investigation are not supposed to be a comprehensive thesis of the prosecution case, but at the same time, must reflect a thorough investigation into the alleged offence. It is on the basis of this record that the court can take effective cognizance of the offence and proceed to issue process in terms of Section 190(1)(b) and Section 204 of the Code. In case of doubt or debate, or if no offence is made out, it is open to the Magistrate to exercise other options which are available to him. **** 29. The final report has to be prepared with these aspects in mind and should show with sufficient particularity and clarity, the contravention of the law which is alleged. When the report complies with the said requirements, the court concerned should apply its mind whether or not to take cognizance and also proceed by issuing summons to the accused. While doing so, the court will take into account the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the documents placed on record by the investigating officer. 30. In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Magistrate can, before taking cognizance, call upon the investigating officer to clarify and give better particulars, order further investigation, or even record statements in terms of Section 202 of the Code." (emphasis supplied) 57 79. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai,68 the question that arose before a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges was whether the prosecution can produce additional documents which are gathered during investigation, after submitting the charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At para 7, it was answered as follows; "7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all the relevant documents at the time of submitting the chargesheet. At the same time, as there is no specific prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the court. In our view, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution and the context in which the police officer is required to forward to the Magistrate all the documents or the relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word "shall" used in sub-section (5) cannot be interpreted as mandatory, but as directory. Normally, the documents gathered during the investigation upon which the prosecution wants to rely are required to be forwarded to the Magistrate, but if there is some omission, it would not mean that the remaining documents cannot be produced subsequently. Analogous provision under Section 173(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was considered by this Court in Narayan Rao v. State of A.P. and it was held that the word "shall" occurring in sub- section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of Section 207- A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the scheme of sub-section (8) of Section 173 also makes it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is 68 (2002) 5 SCC 82 58 not precluded. If further investigation is not precluded then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation. In such cases, there cannot be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained." (emphasis supplied) 80. A two-Judge Bench in Sameer Sandhir v. CBI 69 reiterated the position of law laid down in R.S. Pai (supra). 81. In Velinedipurnam (supra), a Division Bench of the then Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dealt with a reference in context of Section 173(2) and (5) as to whether filing of incomplete charge-sheet within 60/90 days would enable the accused to seek for his release from custody. It was observed as follows; "5. If all the necessary details as contemplated under S. 173(2) , Cr.P.C. are not disclosed in the police report in the first instance, but they are furnished at a later date, perhaps it is for the Court to consider the probative value of those details furnished later during the trial of the case, but to say that the police report filed with certain omissions or gaps is not a valid report contemplated under S. 173(2) is reading something more into the section. Consequently we hold that non-filing of all the enclosures under S. 173(5) along with the report filed under S. 173(2) is not a ground to release the accused on the premise that full charge-sheet is not filed within the stipulated time." (emphasis supplied) 82. It is thus clear that, the purpose of the submission of the Police report in terms of the precedents referred above i.e., in compliance with Section 69 2025 INSC 776 59 193(3) BNSS/ Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself, whether on the basis of the report and the material filed along with the Police report, a case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. After applying his mind to the Police report and the material submitted therewith, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further in accordance with the Cr.P.C . 83. With regard to the options left to a Magistrate, in case of filing of a report by the Investigating Officer, for consideration, a Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) observed that, on filing such report, the Magistrate may do one of the three things i.e., (1) he may accept the report, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or, (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or, (3) he may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report. Brief Overview on the Contents of Police Reports 84. As the law laid down by various precedents has been discussed, it is desirable to look into the Police report filed on 19.07.2025 and the supplementary report on 11.08.2025, strictly for the purpose of assessing whether the reports filed are in compliance of Section 193(3) BNSS or not. This Court has called for the attested copies of the relevant material in this matter for the above purpose. 60 85. Before going further, a short snapshot of the relevant dates in the crime, are as follows; 23.09.2024 FIR No.21/2024 registered against unknown person 22.04.2025 1st Memo filed and names of 29 accused persons were added to the FIR. 01.05.2025 2nd Memo filed adding name of A.30 to the FIR 05.05.2025 3rd Memo filed adding names to A.31 toA.33 (three Respondents before the High Court) to the FIR 17.06.2025 4th Memo filed adding names of A.34 to A.39 as accused 04.07.2025 5th Memo filed adding name of A.40 as accused 19.07.2025 6th Memo filed adding names of A.41 to A.48as accused 19.07.2025 Chargesheet filed against 16 persons 11.08.2025 1st Supplementary Chargesheet filed against the 16 persons and three respondents 15.09.2025 2nd Supplementary Chargesheet filed against A.34 to A.38 86. The relevant dates relating to Accused Nos., 31 to 33, necessary for the purpose of these matters, are mentioned in the tabular form as follows: Date of 90th day of Date of Date of Date of Date of Date of Date of Date of filing of the judicial issuance compli- filing of adding as Arrest remand filing of supplemen custody of of Memo ance of default Accused Charge -tary Accused of the bail Sheet charge Defects defects petition sheet 26.8.25 A.31 16.5.25 17.5.25 14.8.25 (As per 28.8.25 A.32 5.5.25 16.5.25 17.5.25 19.7.25 11.8.25 14.8.25 23.8.25 CFR 26.8.25 A.33 13.5.25 14.5.25 11.8.25 entry 26.8.25 1.9.25) Police report dated 19.07.2025 87. The Police report filed on 19.07.2025 would show the following details; i. It contains the initial of the Officer dated 19.07.2025. It was noted in the CF No.2490 with the date 19.07.2025. ii. The over leaf of the Charge sheet would show that it was filed under Section 193 BNSS, Chapter 28 and Chapter 29 Order No. 480-1, 61 480-2, 481, 482, 487 and 609-5 in Form-69 of Andhra Pradesh State Police Manual. iii. It contains the following information; a) Names of the Parties in Crime No.21 of 2024 b) Date of Registration of Crime c) The offences alleged in the case d) Name of the Investigating Officer e) Name of the Complainant f) Particulars of the Accused persons charge sheeted, Separate sheet is used for each accused g) Details regarding the date of arrest, date on which the person was forwarded to the Court. Offences alleged against the individuals, status of the accused, acknowledged copy of the Notice to the complainant about the progress of the case. h) The Police report filed for sixteen Accused, separate sheets attached mentioning the particulars of each accused with the details of their address, offences alleged, date of arrest, status of the Accused regarding the custody. i) The index of the Police Report would show, it broadly contains the particulars of accused persons charge sheeted: i. Brief overview of the Crime, ii. Legislative Backdrop for Procurement of Liquor through APSBCLL iii. Invitation of offers for supply of IMFL-E- Procurement Notification dt.15.10.2015. 62 iv. Procedure of OFS issue and indenting in the State of Andhra Pradesh Prior to 2019 v. Brief Facts of the Present Crime vi. Execution of the Conspiracy vii. Transaction through Shell companies viii. How the kickbacks received are disposed during general elections- 2024 and other specific cash disposal methods utilized by Accused. ix. Results of Investigation. x. Conclusion. 88. An Official Memorandum was issued by the office of the Special Judge dated 23.08.2025, informing the Investigating Officer about the omissions and 21 defects pointed out by the Office in the police report filed by him on 19.07.2025, requiring the Investigating Officer to comply with the same within three days to take up further action in the matter. This Official Memorandum was shown in the dispatch register as Dis.No.658 dated 23.08.2025. The Investigating Officer received the said Official Memorandum on 25.08.2025. The Investigating Officer filed compliance regarding omissions, showing the date as 26.08.2025 with his signature. But as per the endorsement of the Special Judge directing the Office to 'check and put up' with his initials dated 01.09.2025, it contains the stamp of the Court dated 01.09.2025. The same was recorded with reference to CF-3516 dated 01.09.2025. Along with the Charge sheet, on 19.07.2025, list of witnesses as L.W.1 to L.W.270 and list of documents Volume No.1 to Volume No.43 and other documentary evidences 63 are also filed separately. It contains the initial of the learned Special Judge dated 19.07.2025 along with the Court Stamp with the same date. 89. For the purpose of the present determination, it is apt to extract paragraphs - 341, 342, 343, 344 of the Police Report dated 19.07.2025 "341. It is also prayed to permit the submission of additional statements and documents as and when required. 342. It is necessary to state that considering huge magnitude and complexity of the offence having involved large amounts of money coupled with the non-availability of the absconding accused and deliberate action of transferring the ill-gotten money to several other countries and illegally concealing it in covert financial operations, further investigation is necessary. Due to the deliberate design adopted by the accused to conceal the evidence and abscond from investigation, the investigation into it the present crime needs to be carried on in the interests of justice. As such, further investigation in order to elicit the remaining accused who are at large, unearth and attach ill-gotten crime proceeds, examine several key witnesses, seize and analyze documents, discover the role played by the identified as well as unidentified accused individuals that have aided in manipulation of the excise policy and were the ultimate beneficiary of crime is necessary and required. 343. It is further prayed that permission may be granted for continuing further investigation in this case against other accused arrayed and the role of several other individuals to complete the investigation. It is further prayed that further reports u/s.193(9) BNSS [173(8) CrPC ] will also be filed in this Hon'ble Court. 344. It is therefore, prayed that the Charge sheet be taken on file and issue process against the absconding accused and the accused persons be tried and punished in accordance with law." 64 Supplementary Police Report dated 11.08.2025 90. Coming to the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025, the overleaf contains the final report under Section 193 BNSS in Crime No.21 of 2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, Guntur District. It is filed against 19 persons including the present respondents/A.31 toA.33. Particulars of Accused persons are mentioned in a separate sheet for each Accused. The very first sentence in the Charge Sheet would show that it is filed in addition to the Charge Sheet submitted on 19.07.2025 and in accordance with Section 193(9) BNSS. The details of each accused regarding the offences alleged, date of arrest, their current status, passport number, house address are mentioned. 91. The contents of the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025 broadly would show the following: i. Conspiracy and Crime. ii. Details of financial investigation iii. Details of the technical analysis and forensic analysis iv. Details of further investigation 92. It is pertinent to extract Paras-197, 198, 199 and 200 of the supplementary chargesheet dated 11.08.2025 for the present case; "197. It is also prayed to permit the submission of additional statements and documents as and when required. 198. It is necessary to state that considering huge magnitude and complexity of the offence having involved large amounts of money coupled with the non-availability of the absconding accused and deliberate action of transferring the ill-gotten money to several other countries and illegally concealing it in covert financial operations, 65 further investigation is necessary. Due to the deliberate design adopted by the accused to conceal the evidence and abscond from investigation, the investigation into it the present crime needs to be carried on in the interests of justice. As such, further investigation in order to elicit the remaining accused who are at large, unearth and attach ill- gotten crime proceeds, examine several key witnesses, seize and analyze documents, discover the role played by the identified as well as unidentified accused individuals that have aided in manipulation of the excise policy and were the ultimate beneficiary of crime is necessary and required. 199. It is further prayed that permission may be granted for continuing further investigation in this case against other accused arrayed and the role of several other individuals to complete the investigation. It is further prayed that further reports u/s.193(9) BNSS [173(8) CrPC ] will also be filed in this Hon'ble Court. 200. It is therefore, prayed that the Charge sheet be taken on file and issue process against the absconding accused and the accused persons be tried and punished in accordance with law." 93. Along with the Supplementary Charge sheet, Investigating Officer filed Memo of evidence received in the Office of the Special Judge on the same dated i.e. 11.08.2025. It shows L.Ws.20,34,35,76, 243, 246 and 261 were further examined.L.W.272 to 292 were the witnesses examined. List of witnesses examined under Section 183 BNSS, which is corresponding to Section 164 Cr.P.C. mentioned as L.Ws.277, 282, 283. List of documents Volume 44 to 57 are placed before the Court along with mediators' report. It is apt to mention that the 21 defects pointed out by the Office of the Learned Special Judge in the supplementary report are the very same defects pointed out in the Police report filed on 19.07.2025. 66 Basis for the Impugned Orders 94. The impugned orders were passed placing reliance mainly on the decisions rendered in by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ritu Chhabbaria (supra), Dinesh Dalmia (supra), Fakhrey Alam (supra), Satender Kumar Antil, this Court in Akula Raviteja (supra), Bombay High Court in Sarath Chandra Vinayak Dongre and others v. State of Maharashtra, Delhi High Court in Avinash Jain (supra) and Chitra Ramkrishna (supra) and High Court for the State of Telangana in C. Parthasarathy (supra). Further, the reasons taken into consideration by the learned Special Judge in passing impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 can be classified as follows; A. Some Defects not cured: To this, learned Special Judge gave examples of FSL reports missing, sanctions under the Prevention of Corruption Act not filed, tabular format of proceeds, siphoned amount only small portion traced. B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation Sought: The real legal test for grant of statutory bail is not whether a chargesheet is filed, it is whether the investigation is complete. Both the preliminary and supplementary charge sheets were incomplete because investigation was admittedly still pending. The Charge sheet itself says further investigation and more accused/evidence to be found. As the investigation is incomplete, the right to default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS is triggered. C. Investigation pending qua other Accused: Police were splitting the charge sheets for different accused and filing them before completing the full 67 investigation, which is termed as clever contrivance. Applying the ratio of Ritu Chhabbaria (supra), a charge sheet filed without completing investigation cannot defeat default bail, a fundamental right under Article 21. The decision in Kapil Wadhwan (supra), is not binding precedent since it has not taken note of Ritu Chhabaria (supra). D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken: Since the chargesheet was incomplete, the court could not take cognizance and therefore custody could not be extended using Section 309 Cr.P.C. which applies post- cognizance. No statutory power exists as in other Special Acts to extend remand beyond 90 days in this case and therefore, there is no option except to grant statutory bail. 95. This Court would now deal with each of these considerations on the touchstone of settled criminal jurisprudence as has been discussed in the previous portion. A. Some defects not cured 96. Undisputably, police report, i.e., charge sheet and supplementary charge sheet in the present case, were filed within the statutory period of ninety days from the date of judicial remand of Respondents/ Accused Nos. 31 to 33. The Respondents admittedly filed their default bail petitions only two weeks after the submission of these reports. The core issue is that, although the charge sheets were filed, the Respondents contended that they were "incomplete" due to defects pointed out by the Special Court, and therefore, for the purposes of Section 187(3)(ii), should be treated as if no charge sheet was filed. The State, on the other hand, argued that once a charge sheet is filed within the statutory 68 period, the accused's right to default bail automatically ceases. The Learned Special Judge, however, accepted the reasoning advanced by the Accused. 97. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents/Accused Nos., 31 to 33 in one voice submitted that the very prayer regarding quashment of Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 on the Charge Sheets filed by the Investigating Agency dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 is not maintainable since the Official Memoranda issued to the Investigating Officer is only an administrative act and not a judicial order. Learned Senior Counsel for the State would submit that Official Memoranda issued by the Court dated 23.08.2025 are contrary to law and reflect non-application of mind. The State seeks the quashment of such Memoranda since they were issued by the Learned Special Judge, which contain his signature. Refuting the same, Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel submits that if such an argument is to be accepted, the State should have challenged the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 immediately, but not after sufferance of an adverse order from the Court. 98. This Court concurs with the submissions of the Respondents that the issuance of Official Memoranda by the Learned Special Judge to Investigating Officer for rectifying defects is essentially an administrative act. The issuance of such memoranda does not involve hearing the parties or adjudicating any matter. Although the memoranda bear the signature of the learned Special Judge, in practice, it is the Clerk on the Criminal Side, along with the Property Clerk, who compiles the original FIR, documents, and any property received, and presents them to Superintendent of the Court. The Superintendent verifies the charge sheet and prepares an office note for the 69 Judge to take cognizance. If the Superintendent identifies defects, they are pointed out in the office note, which the Judge merely reviews and signs. This signature does not convert the memoranda into a judicial order, it only remains an administrative action signed after verification of office objections, not a decision on the judicial side. 99. The defects pointed out by the Court in the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 formed one of the primary grounds relied upon by the Learned Special Judge while granting default bail to the Respondents. Consequently, State has also challenged these very Official Memorandums. This Court is of the considered opinion that for a proper and comprehensive appreciation of the legal issues arising in the present case, it is appropriate to examine the contents of the Official Memorandums dated 23.08.2025. As rightly contended by Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, the Official Memoranda per se, being administrative in nature, are not liable to be quashed and may be referred to only for contextual understanding of the matter. 100. It is apt to refer the observations made by a two-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharif Ahmed (supra), while dealing with the issue of the complete charge sheet to the effect that in case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Learned Magistrate can, call upon the Investigating Officer to clarify and give better particulars, order further investigation, or even record statements in terms of Section 202 of the Code before taking cognizance. Therefore, it is the bounden duty of the Investigating Officer to make clear and complete entries of all columns in the Chargesheet so that the Court can clearly understand which crime has been 70 committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the file. Now let us examine, the defects pointed by the Learned Special Judge and rectification of such defects by the Investigating Officer. For this Purpose, Annexure-II enclosed to the Written Arguments submitted by the Petitioner/ State, is extracted as under: Defect Response Accused copies of charge The proviso to S.193(8) BNSS permits the 1 sheet along with investigating agency to submit copies of the documents for all the police report along with other documents accused who are arrayed duly indexed to the Magistrate for supply to as accused in the charge the accused as required/S.230 through sheet to be filed. electronic communication. Thus, the investigating agency has provided the charge sheets along with all the documents to the Court in the form of soft copies in open drives. (Compliance shown) To state how the charge There is no bar to initiate criminal sheet is maintainable proceedings and to file a chargesheet 2 against Al without against a Public Servant without obtaining obtaining the previous a sanction for prosecution. Sanction is sanction for prosecution required only to enable the Court to take from the competent cognizance of the offence. [Refer to authority U/s.19 of the PC Judgebir Singh V.NIA,(2023) 17 SCC 48]. Act 1988. Steps to obtain a sanction u/S.19 PC Act for a.1 has been undertaken on 18.07.2025. [This omission/defect is perverse in law] To state how the Old PC The provisions of the Prevention of 3 Act 1988 is attracts Corruption Act, 1988 (amended vide Act against the accused in this No.16 of 2018) are invoked in the case. case for the offences (Compliance shown) U/s.7, 7A, 8, 9, 12, 13 (1) (b) and 13 (2) of PC Act 1988. How many witnesses were The number of witnesses examined 4 examined U/s.161 Cr.P.C ., u/S.180 BNSS have been mentioned in (180 BNSS) to be Para.363 of the Chargesheet dated mentioned in list of 19.07.2025 and in Para.191 of the documents as well as Supplementary chargehset dated charge sheet. 11.08.2025. In addition to the same, the IO has filed a Memo of Evidence 1 & Memo of Evidence 71 2 to place on record detailed List Witnesses and Documents. [Compliance shown]. How many witnesses were The number of witnesses examined S.183 examined U/s.164 Cr.P.C . BNSS have been mentioned in Para.364 of 5 (183 BNSS) to be the Chargesheet dated 19.07.2025 and in mentioned in list of Para.193 of the Supplementary Charge documents as well as sheet dated 11.08.2025. charge sheet. In addition to the same, the IO has filed a Memo of Evidence 1 &Memo of Evidence 2 to place on record detailed List of witnesses and documents. Description of documents The detailed description of documents in 6 to be mentioned correctly the List of Documents have been provided in list of documents. in the Memo of Evidence 1 & Memo of Evidence 2 filed by the IO. (Compliance shown). All the mediators reports The same has been complied vide Memo of and seizure reports to be Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed 7 mentioned list of by the IO. documents. (Compliance Shown). All the documents filed The same has been complied vide Memo of along with FIR, Remand Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed by 8 Report as well as Charge the IO. Sheet to be mentioned in (Compliance Shown) list of documents with full descriptive particulars. List of witnesses and List The same has been complied vide Memo 9 of documents to be filed in of Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 proper format. filed by the IO. (Compliance shown). List of M.O.s to be A detailed table stating the same has been mentioned in charge mentioned in Para.367 of the Chargesheet 10 sheet and their CP dated 19.07.2025 and in Para.188 of the numbers to be mentioned Chargesheet dated 11.08.2025. against the said material (Compliance shown). objects. Investigation Officer to be The same has been complied vide Memo of signed on conclusion Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed 11 pages of the List of by the IO. witnesses and List of (Compliance shown) documents. The Serial Number of the The Accused Number against each 12 accused in the charge Accused has been specifically mentioned sheet is not tallied with in brackets next to the name the crime record. (Compliance shown) 72 As per contents of the The title of the Chargesheet dated charge sheet the19.07.2025 clearly indicates that it is a Final 13 Investigation is still Report u/S.193 BNSS. Although, the IO has pending but nowhere in inadvertently used the term 'Preliminary the charge sheet is Chargesheet' in the Compliances mentioned that the charge dt.26.08.2025, there is no concept of filing sheet preliminary or final of a 'Preliminary Chargesheet' either under the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual or under the BNSS. A Rectification Petition [CF No.3820 of 2025] to that effect has been filed before the Spl.Judge on 08.09.2025.The final Report dated 19.07.2025 ought to be considered as a Chargesheet in accordance with S.193(3) BNSS. (Compliance shown). How the charge sheet is The issue of whether filing of chargesheet maintainable without without FSL Reports entitles the Accused to 14 filing the some of the FSL Default Bail is still pending before the reports. larger bench of the Supreme Court and that there is no definite decision holding that the absence of FSL Reports due to systemic delays makes the Chargesheet incomplete. Alternatively, if at all it could be said to be a curable irregularity and is not an illegality which renders the Chargesheet to be incomplete. In any case, 47 FSL Reports have already been submitted to the Trial Court and the same are annexed along with Volume 43A of the Preliminary Chargesheet dated 11.08.2025. [This Omission/defect is not tenable and contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Hon'ble Court in Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa Raghavendra Buvanahalli Muniyappa Nagesh babu V. State of AP 2009 SCC Online AP 264 [Paras.8-10, 20- 22] It is mentioned in charge Details with respect to the same have been 15 sheet that an amount of mentioned in paragraphs 110 to 113 of Rs.3500 Crores was Charge sheet dated 19.07.2025. siphoned details of the [Compliance shown] amount should be filed in a tabular form matching the figure. 73 The representatives and The reason for their non-arrest has been 16 their designations of the stated in compliance dated 26.08.2025. accused No.7 to 15 to be Learned Special Judge has misconstrued mentioned properly, and the serial numbers as Accused numbers in reasons for their non- the proforma of the Charge sheet. arrest to be assigned. Learned Special Judge is referring A.11 to A.17 and A.25 toA.26and has inadvertently stated A.7toA.15. A.11 is a shell company represented by a person named Prem Prakash Yadav. A.12 toA.15 are shell companies represented by a person named Anil Chokra. Shell Companies such as A.16 and A.17 are represented by A.9 who is absconding. NBW has been issued against him on 28.07.2025. 17 The role of the Accused Learned Special Judge has misconstrued Nos. 7 to 15 in charge sheet Serial Numbers as accused Numbers in the to be mentioned in charge proforma charge sheet. sheet specifically. Learned Special Judge is referring A.11 to A.17 and A.25 toA.26and has inadvertently stated A.7toA.15. The specific roles attributed to the Accused have been stated in para 370 of the Charge sheet dated 19.07.2025. The said companies are shell companies. {Compliance Shown} 18 The punishable sections The defect is complied, vide Compliance to be mentioned against dated 26.08.2025 filed by the IO. for each and every (Compliance shown) accused who are described in charge sheet, separately. 19 Under what provision The Section under which further this court as competent investigation has been sought has been to grant permission for stated in the charge sheet dated 19.07.2025 continuing further and 11.08.2025. investigation in this case The State of Tamil Nadu V. Hemendra against the other Reddy (2023) 16 SCC 79 has held that the accused to be police is permitted to carry out further mentioned. investigation u/s.173(8) of Cr.P.C. dehores any direction from the Court. It is pertinent to note that the proviso to Section 193(9) BNSS Mandates the Police 74 Officer to take permission of the Magistrate to carry out further investigation only once the trial has commenced. How many accused are The details of arrest are provided in para 20 arrested and from when - 365 of the Charge Sheet dated they are in judicial 19.07.2025 as well as paragraph-194 of custody to be mentioned supplementary charge sheet dated in charge sheet. 11.08.2025. Prayer portion of the The same has been shown to be complied 21 charge sheet to be vide Compliances dated 26.08.2025. mentioned correctly. 101. A careful perusal of the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 reveal that the Learned Special Judge noted that, although copies of the charge sheet and the list of documents were filed through electronic means, several significant objections remained unrectified. These included the non-filing of the FSL report, the absence of sanction orders required to prosecute public servants, lack of detailed particulars showing the extent of misappropriation or siphoning of crime proceeds by each accused in a tabular form, and the omission of details concerning the recovery of such crime proceeds. It is beneficial to identify the legality of each of these objections. I. Non filing of Sanction orders to prosecute the Accused, who are Public Servants 102. In the case of hand, specifically, with respect to obtaining sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act for Accused No. 1, compliance report reflects that a requisition was sent on 18.07.2025, and the sanction order was awaited. It is important to emphasize that it is the statutory duty of the Investigating Officer to submit all material collected during the course of investigation against a public servant to the competent appointing authority while seeking such 75 sanction. In the present case, since the police report was filed before the Special Court on 19.07.2025, Investigating Officer had appropriately initiated the process by submitting the requisition for sanction a day earlier, on 18.07.2025. One of the objections raised by the learned trial Judge for return of the charge sheet is that the same was filed without obtaining previous sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act for Accused No.1. 103. With regard to the necessity to obtain sanction for filing of charge sheet, it is essential to refer to the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain (supra), wherein it was categorically held that the sanction and investigation are on separate footings as sanction is an enabling provision to prosecute, which is totally separate from the concept of investigation which is concluded by the filing of the charge-sheet. Failure of the prosecution in obtaining and filing of the sanction along with the charge sheet, does not automatically give right to the Accused to seek statutory bail, when the charge-sheet is filed well within the period contemplated under Section 167(2)(a)(ii) CrPC. 104. Later, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Judgebir Singh (supra) while reaffirming the principles laid down in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain (supra), categorically held that the issuance of a sanction order to prosecute an accused who is a Government employee is the exclusive responsibility of competent sanctioning authority, which functions independently and is not connected with the investigation process. 105. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Judgebir Singh (supra) further clarified that any delay in according such sanction does not invalidate or vitiate 76 the final report filed by the Investigating Agency before the Court. It was further held that Section 173 Cr.P.C. does not make any reference to the filing of a sanction order, and Section 167 Cr.P.C. pertains solely to the investigation process, not to the stage of cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, once a final report is filed within the prescribed period, signifying completion of investigation, the accused cannot claim a right to default bail merely because the sanction order has not yet been filed. 106. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Judgebir Singh (supra) further clarified that a sanction order issued by the competent authority can be produced and placed on record even after the filing of the charge sheet. However, if there is undue delay in producing the sanction order, the accused may seek regular bail on the ground of delay in trial but it was categorically held that such delay cannot form the basis for claiming default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. 107. In the instant case, admittedly, the objection raised by the learned Special Judge is with regard to non-filing of sanction for Accused No.1. As was discussed in the precedents referred supra, non-filing of sanction order along with the charge sheet, is a curable defect, which can be rectified at the subsequent time and the same cannot entitle the Accused to seek default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 and the objection raised by the learned Special Judge on this aspect, is not tenable. 77 II. Charge Sheet filed without FSL Reports 108. Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on Tara Singh v. State,70 to buttress his contention that a chargesheet merely sans FSL report is not incomplete. 109. In Tara Singh (supra), the issue for consideration was whether the challan submitted by police could be regarded as complete so as to enable the Court to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. 1898. A four Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the challan in that case was indeed complete, notwithstanding the absence of the Imperial Serologist's report and the sketch map of the scene of occurrence. Referring to Section 173(1) of the Cr.P.C.1898, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a police report or challan is complete, if it sets forth the essential particulars, i.e., the names of the parties, the nature of the information, and the names of persons acquainted with the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it was held that the cognizance taken by the Court on such a report was proper and valid in law. 110. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the decision in Tara Singh (supra) must be distinguished from the present case, as the FSL reports here pertain to data extracted from mobile phones, whereas the report in Tara Singh (supra) was that of a Serologist. He argued that the information emerging from such data could potentially reveal crucial circumstances requiring further investigation. This contention, however, is far- 70 1951 Supreme Court Cases 903 78 fetched and contingent on uncertain possibilities, and therefore does not support his version at this stage for consideration under Section 187 BNSS. 111. It is necessary to refer to the decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa (supra), which dealt with a reference on the point whether the charge sheet which was filed within ninety days, but was returned for compliance of certain technical objections of not filing the scientific experts report is a proper compliance under section 173 Cr.P.C. and whether the same confer any right on the accused to seek bail as a matter of right as required under Section 167 Cr.P.C. It was observed by the Division Bench that reports which are pending with the Science Laboratory are not within the control of the Investigating Agency and the chargesheet filed therein having satisfied the requirements under Section 173(2) is sufficient compliance to extinguish the indefeasible right of statutory bail. It was also observed that a chargesheet filed containing the particulars mentioned in Section 173 (2) is valid, irrespective of the fact that it did not contain some of the documents as required under Section 173 (5) as they can be produced at a later stage by supplying copies to the Accused, with the permission of the Court. 112. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Anantha Satya Udaya Bhaskara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh71 , dealt with a case wherein the petitioner sought default bail in a case under Sections 302 , 201 , and 34 of the IPC, along with Sections 3(1)(r) , 3(1)(s) , and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes 71 2022 SCC OnLine AP 2166 79 and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 . His plea for default bail was rejected by trial Court on the ground that the police had filed chargesheet within the statutory period in compliance with Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., and the mere non-filing of the scientific expert's report did not entitle the petitioner to default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. This Court upheld this view, holding that the charge sheet filed was complete in substance, being sufficient for the concerned Court to take cognizance of the offences. 113. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Kamalaksha v. Sub Inspector of Police and Another,72 observed that when a Police Report or Charge Sheet contains necessary details so as to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and proceed further, it cannot be said that there is failure of compliance of Section 173(5) Cr.P.C. just because the scientific reports have not been produced along with the Charge Sheet filed by the Police Officer. It was also observed that the question as to whether the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to establish its case will be a matter to be decided at the close of the trial and not when cognizance is taken of the offence alleged. 114. It is also essential to refer to the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Ram Kishore Arora (supra), wherein it was observed that the preparation of the FSL report lies beyond the control of the investigating agency, even though it may take steps to expedite the process. The Court noted that the investigating agency had already submitted the necessary documents to the FSL for expert analysis and had categorically stated that the investigation against 72 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 482 80 the petitioner was complete. It was further held that the mere issuance of summons to another individual or a request to place additional evidence on record does not, by itself, render the investigation incomplete or entitle the accused to claim default bail in the absence of any substantial grounds challenging the completeness of the investigation. 115. It is also relevant to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hanif Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi )73, was posed with an issue as to whether a chargesheet filed without the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report is "incomplete," thereby entitling an accused to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC read with Section 36A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.74 In Hanif Ansari (supra), the petitioner was accused of possessing 2 kg of heroin, contended that since the FSL report confirming the substance as heroin was filed months after the chargesheet, he is entitled to statutory right to bail. The State opposed this, arguing that a spot test had already identified the contraband and that validity of the chargesheet was unaffected by absence of the FSL report. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 19.03.2024 noted the divergent judicial opinions on this issue, wherein some benches holding that the FSL report is essential to complete a chargesheet, others ruling it is not. Referring to Kapil Wadhawan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that the non-filing of all documents does not automatically vitiate a chargesheet or create a right to default bail, but since the question remains legally unsettled. In that light, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that the case 73 2024 SCC OnLine SC 537 74 For short, NDPS Act 81 be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for tagging with the lead matter i.e., Directorate of Enforcement v. Manpreet Singh Talwar (SLP (Crl .) No. 5724/2023), which is pending before a larger Bench, for an authoritative decision on whether omission of the FSL report pertaining to the seized contraband article(s) along with the chargesheet, within the time specified in Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 36A of the NDPS Act, would entitle the accused to default bail or not. 116. In the instant case, while complying with the defect regarding the FSL reports, total forty-seven(47) FSL reports which were annexed with the final report dated 19.07.2025 were already filed and seizures which were also carried out after 19.07.2025 were also mentioned in the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025. In such circumstances, contention of the learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.33 that filing of FSL report along with charge sheet is mandatory for compliance of Section 193 (3) BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(2) Cr.P.C), is not sustainable since the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tara Singh (supra) (Four-Judges Bench) holds the field as on today. Therefore, on the strength of the authorities presently subsisting in Tara Singh (supra), Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa (supra), Kamalaksha (supra), Anantha Satya Udaya Bhaskara Rao (supra) and Ram Kishore Arora (supra), this Court is unable to reach a finding that the chargesheet sans FSL Report makes it incomplete. Therefore, such a ground cannot be one of the reasons for grant of default bail terming the police report as "incomplete". 82 III. Details of Misappropriated funds 117. Further, the learned Special Judge's reliance on the "details of misappropriation of siphoning of crime proceeds by each accused in a tabular form", "recovery of the proceeds of the crime" or "untraced siphoned money" to conclude that investigation was incomplete is unsustainable in the view of this Court, because recovery is an evidentiary matter that belongs exclusively to the domain of trial and has no bearing on default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS. Non-recovery may perhaps impact proof at trial as it is an aspect concerning the merit of the allegations, but it cannot revive or create a right to default bail. B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation Sought 118. The Learned Judge observed that in the Memo filed before the Court, the Investigating Officer sought extension of remand on the ground that investigation is pending and in the Charge sheet also it is mentioned that further investigation is pending against other Accused and also the present Accused. 119. On this point, it is the contention of Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.31 that the Investigating Officer has to obtain prior permission of the Court for conducting further investigation. Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 also contended that a formal permission of the Court is required to be obtained by the Police before conducting further investigation. However, it is the contention of Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner / State, there is no mention in Section 173(8) Cr.P.C about the permission to be taken from the Court for conducting further investigation and so far as Section 193 (9) is 83 concerned, the Investigating Agency is not required to take permission of the Court for carrying out further investigation as long as the trial has not commenced and that as a courtesy, it was informed to Special Judge about the pendency of further investigation. 120. Under the Code of 1898, there was no express provision enabling the Police to make further investigation after a final report under Sec.173(1) had been submitted. Though a report under Sec.173 (2) can be submitted only after completion of the investigation, new sub-Section (8) to Sec.173 enabled the Police to carry on further investigation, as recommended by the Law Commission, on the ground that it would be unfair both to the prosecution or to the accused if the investigating officer, after submitting his report under Sec.173 (2), comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused and that is shut out from the Court. 121. In Vinay Tyagi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of Section 173 (8) observed as follows; "49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct "further investigation" or file supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct "further investigation" and file "supplementary report" 84 with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct "further investigation" and/or to file a "supplementary report" will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process." (emphasis supplied) 122. In Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana,75 the Hon'ble Supreme Court provided that the permission of the Magistrate under Section 173 (8) is though not specifically provided, but is in practice followed. Relevant extract reads thus; "21. In this context, we may notice the statutory scheme pertaining to investigation. Section 173 CrPC empowers the police officer conducting investigation to file a report on completion of the investigation with the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. Section 173(8) CrPC empowers the officer-in-charge to conduct further investigation even after filing of a report under Section 173(2) CrPC if he obtains further evidence, oral or documentary. Thus, the power of the police officer under Section 173(8) CrPC is unrestricted. Needless to say, the Magistrate has no power to interfere but it would be appropriate on the part of the investigating officer 75 (2016) 4 SCC 160 85 to inform the Court. It has been so stated in Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ." (emphasis supplied) 123. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat,76 which is relied on by the High Court of Delhi in Java Singh (supra), categorically held that further investigation is permissible, however, reinvestigation is prohibited. The law does not mandate taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for further investigation. Carrying out a further investigation even after filing of the charge- sheet is a statutory right of the police. It was further held that even after submission of police report under Section 173 (2) on completion of investigation, the police has a right to "further" investigation under Section 173(8) but not "fresh investigation" or "reinvestigation". The meaning of "Further" is additional; more; or supplemental. "Further" investigation, therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. 124. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Dalmia (supra), wherein the chargesheet has mentioned that further investigation would be necessary on certain vital points including "end use of funds". Relying on the decision of the Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami (supra), it was observed thus; 76 (2004) 5 SCC 347 86 "20. Indisputably, the power of the investigating officer to make a prayer for making further investigation in terms of sub-section (8) of Section 173 is not taken away only because a charge-sheet under sub-section (2) thereof has been filed. A further investigation is permissible even if order of cognizance of offence has been taken by the Magistrate. *** 24. Concededly, the investigating agency is required to complete investigation within a reasonable time. The ideal period therefor would be 24 hours, but, in some cases, it may not be practically possible to do so. Parliament, therefore, thought it fit that remand of the accused can be sought for in the event investigation is not completed within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be. But, if the same is not done within the stipulated period, the same would not be detrimental to the accused and, thus, he, on the expiry thereof would be entitled to apply for bail, subject to fulfilling the conditions prescribed therefor. 25. Such a right of bail although is a valuable right but the same is a conditional one; the condition precedent being pendency of the investigation. Whether an investigation in fact has remained pending and the investigating officer has submitted the charge-sheet only with a view to curtail the right of the accused would essentially be a question of fact. Such a question strictly does not arise in this case inasmuch as, according to CBI, sufficient materials are already available for prosecution of the appellant. According to it, further investigation would be inter alia necessary on certain vital points including end use of the funds. *** 39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge-sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the 87 Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code." (emphasis supplied) 125. As already discussed, Sec.193 BNSS corresponds to Sec.173 Cr.P.C.1973 with some additions. Under Sec.173 (8), the Investigating officer would be competent to examine such further evidence and send a supplementary report to the Magistrate, complying with the requirements of Sec.173 (2) to (6). "Fresh" investigation or "re-investigation" is not contemplated by Sec.173 (8), as rightly pointed by the learned Counsel for the Accused. What Sec.173 (8) provides for is further investigation by the same agency. For holding fresh investigation or reinvestigation, fresh permission of the Magistrate is required. Moreover, it is also settled that further investigation is to be undertaken from the same offence, not into further investigation in the separate offence. 126. Section 193(9) of BNSS is a corresponding version of Section 173 (8) of Cr.P.C., but with a newly added proviso that stipulates that the further investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court trying the case and it shall be completed within a period of 90 days, extendable with the permission of the Court. However, there is no mention about seeking of such permission at the pre-trial stage. Recently, in Yash Mishra v. State of NCT of Delhi and Others,77 a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court 77 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5684 88 declined to rule Section 193 (9) read with Section 187 (3) as arbitrary and ultra vires. In this light, the following observation was made; "14. So far as the submission that provision of 'further investigation' as contained in Section 193(9) is camouflage to defeat the right of the accused person to seek 'default bail' under Section 187(3) of BNSS 2023, we may only observe that the provision contained in Section 193(9) and those of Section 187(3), operate in different fields and further that Section 193(9) does not in any manner acts as a camouflage to such right." (emphasis supplied) 127. So far as the instant case concerns, admittedly trial has not been commenced. In the charge sheet itself at para 343 of the police report dated 19.07.2025 and para 199 of the supplementary report dated 11.08.2025 are clear to that effect, that permission is sought to conduct further investigation and file additional material, if any, found during investigation. Thus, in view of the judgments referred to supra, terming the chargesheet as incomplete on the ground that further investigation was sought cannot be countenanced. C. Investigation pending qua other Accused: 128. At cost of repetition, in this case, final report and supplementary charge sheet have been originally filed within a period of 90 days. After two weeks of filing such charge sheets, Accused Nos.31 to 33 filed petitions before Special Court seeking default bail. The learned counsel for respondents argued in one voice that the charge sheet is incomplete since investigation is pending 89 against the other Accused. It is the contention of learned Senior Counsel representing Accused Nos.,31 to 33 that splitting up of charge sheets and filing of piece-meal charge sheets is only for the purpose of scuttling the right of the Accused to be released on default bail. It is a settled principle of law that filing of piecemeal and incomplete charge sheets cannot be considered as final report as they are impermissible. Per contra, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for State that merely because the remand extension memos filed after filing of the charge sheet contained the grounds pertaining to further investigation on certain aspects related to the larger conspiracy, it does not indicate that the investigation against Accused Nos.,31 to 33 is still pending or that the charge sheet is incomplete. 129. On this point, it is essential to refer to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan (supra), wherein the question for consideration was whether the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the statutory bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC, on the ground that the investigation qua some of the accused named in the FIR was pending, though the charge-sheet against the respondents along with the other accused was filed within the prescribed time-limit and though the cognizance of the offence was taken by the special court before the consideration default bail. 130. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan (supra), while reiterating the settled legal position that the right of default bail under Section 167 (2) is not only a statutory right but a right flowing from Article 21 , had referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (supra), to emphasise that the custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not 90 governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the Cr.P.C . The Hon'ble Supreme Court further noted that there remains no doubt that if the statutory requirements under Section 173 (2) stand complied, when the particulars indicated therein are included in the reported. At para 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the question of law as follows; "23. The benefit of proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to the offender only when a charge-sheet is not filed and the investigation is kept pending against him. Once however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases. It may be noted that the right of the investigating officer to pray for further investigation in terms of sub-section (8) of Section 173 is not taken away only because a charge-sheet is filed under sub-section (2) thereof against the accused. Though ordinarily all documents relied upon by the prosecution should accompany the charge-sheet, nonetheless for some reasons, if all the documents are not filed along with the charge-sheet, that reason by itself would not invalidate or vitiate the charge-sheet. It is also well settled that the court takes cognizance of the offence and not the offender. Once from the material produced along with the charge-sheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of charge-sheet would neither vitiate the charge-sheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the charge-sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet 91 or that the charge-sheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) CrPC." (emphasis supplied) 131. In Dablu Kujur (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having examined the importance of a complete police report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC, emphasized that the investigating officer must strictly comply with the statutory requirements while submitting a chargesheet. The decision in Kapil Wadhawan (supra) was reiterated in the following manner; "18. Such issues often arise when the accused would make his claim for default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC and contend that all the documents having not been submitted as required under Section 173(5), or the investigation qua some of the persons having been kept open while submitting police report under Section 173(2), the requirements under Section 173(2) could not be said to have been complied with. In this regard, this Court recently held in CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan [CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 3 SCC 734 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 300] that : (SCC p. 748, para 23) "23. ... Once from the material produced along with the charge-sheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of charge- sheet would neither vitiate the charge-sheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the charge-sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet or that the charge-sheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) CrPC." (emphasis supplied) 132. Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents would submit that the purported charge sheets filed by the 92 Investigating Officer are not in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual. Learned Senior Counsel brought to the notice of this Court that Form- 69 of A.P. Police Rules, Column-12, which stipulates mentioning "particulars of accused persons not charge sheeted". Moreover, Section 193(3) BNSS stipulates "a report in the form as the State Government may, by rules provide". Learned Senior Counsel also made special emphasis on Paragraphs 478(9), 478(10), 479(5), 479(6) of Andhra Pradesh Police Manual. Sri Sidharth Luthra, vehemently opposed this argument and submitted that the Investigating Officer followed the Manual and Charge sheets were filed as per Rule 480-1, in Form- 69 by mentioning all the details required to the Court to proceed for inquiry. 133. A bare perusal of the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 would reveal that the learned Special Judge had placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered in Ritu Chhabaria (supra) and considered Kapil Wadhawan (supra) as not binding as the latter did not take note of the former. Factual position in Ritu Chhabaria (supra) was that FIR was initially registered for offences under IPC and the PC Act, without naming the petitioner's husband. Subsequent supplementary charge-sheets were filed, one of which showed him as a prosecution witness, and later ones did not name him at all. After the investigation was transferred, he was arrested by the CBI on 28.4.2022, and further supplementary charge-sheets described him as a suspect, leading to repeated extensions of his remand under Section 309(2) CrPC without granting default bail. The writ petition ultimately challenged the continued custody and alleged that the repeated filing of supplementary charge-sheets was a deliberate attempt to deny the accused his statutory right to default bail. In this context, 93 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that first investigation is to be completed, and only then can a chargesheet be filed within the stipulated period, and failure to do so would trigger the statutory right of default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. Relevant portion is as follows; "25. This right of statutory bail, however, is extinguished, if the charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated period. The question of resorting to a supplementary charge-sheet under Section 173(8) CrPC only arises after the main charge-sheet has been filed, and as such, a supplementary charge-sheet, wherein it is explicitly stated that the investigation is still pending, cannot under any circumstance, be used to scuttle the right of default bail, for then, the entire purpose of default bail is defeated, and the filing of a charge-sheet or a supplementary charge-sheet becomes a mere formality, and a tool, to ensue that the right of default bail is scuttled." 134. It is indeed true that the review preferred by the CBI on the decision in Ritu Chhabaria (supra) was dismissed, vide order dated 31.07.2025 in R.P. (Crl.) No.124/2025. It is brought to the notice of this Court by learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra that a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manpreet Singh Talwar (supra), had expressly clarified that trial courts and High Courts must consider applications for default bail independent of and without relying on Ritu Chhabbaria (supra) in following terms; ""In continuation of the interim order of this Court dated 1 May 2023, we clarify that the order shall not preclude any trial court or, as the case may be, High Court from considering an application for the grant of default bail under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 independent of and without relying on the judgment dated 26 April 2023 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No 60 of 2023." 94 135. Learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.33, during the course of arguments, fairly conceded that, in the light of the interim order passed by the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which is in force, they are not relying on Ritu Chhabaria (supra). Learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.31 would submit that, even in absence of Ritu Chhabaria (supra), Accused No.31 got a good case to succeed in the light of settled principles of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned Special Judge went on discussing the judgment in Ritu Chhabaria (supra), and held that the said judgment holds the field and is binding. In the light of the submissions referred to supra, this Court is of the humble view that, as on the date of passing the impugned order, the interim order passed by the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manpreet Singh Talwar (supra) was in force. It is also pertinent to mention that Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Registry to list the batch of matters on the same issue regarding the Ritu Chhabaria (supra), before the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 136. In addition to relying on Ritu Chhabaria (supra), the impugned order is also based on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Fakhrey Alam (supra), this Court in Akula Ravi Teja (supra) and the Delhi High Court in Avinash Jain (supra) and Chitra Ramkrishna (supra). These decisions along with Tunde Gbaja (supra), were relied on by the learned counsel for the Accused also, to submit that statutory bail was granted finding the chargesheets to be incomplete. 95 137. The reliance on Fakhrey Alam(supra) is misplaced as it pertains to filing of chargesheet is filed after the filing of default bail application, after expiry of statutory period. 138. Coming to Akula Ravi Teja (supra), against the petitioner/ Accused No.3 therein a case was registered under Sections 143, 148, 188, 269, 324, 307 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC, and he was remanded to judicial custody on 05.06.2020. The police filed a preliminary charge sheet in Crime No.453 of 2020 on 28.08.2020. The Learned Magistrate returned the same with certain objections. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a petition seeking default bail on the ground that the police failed to complete the investigation within the statutory period of ninety days. The Learned Magistrate dismissed the petition on the ground that the charge sheet had been filed within time and that it had only been returned for compliance with some objections. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the State that the Investigating Officer could not examine some witnesses because they were in judicial custody, and some crucial witnesses in the counter case were absconding; hence, there was no lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer. While dealing with the plea for default bail, Learned Single Judge categorically held that there was no legal flaw in the Magistrate's finding and held that if a charge sheet is filed within the statutory period, the fact that it is returned for compliance with technical objections does not confer a right on the accused to claim default bail. 139. Thereafter, Learned Single Judge in Akula Ravi Teja (supra), at para 15, referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the composite High 96 Court of Andhra Pradesh in Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa (supra), and held that the Magistrate's finding could not be considered erroneous. With respect to the second ground, the Learned Single Judge noted that in that case, the charge sheet filed was admittedly only a preliminary charge sheet, which itself indicated that it was not possible for the Investigating Officer to specify the overt acts of each accused until recording the statements of twenty two (22) crucial witnesses who were lodged as remand prisoners in the Central Prison, Rajahmundry, in a counter case, as well as eight other crucial witnesses who were absconding. Thus, the contents of the charge sheet clearly indicated that the investigation had not been completed and that the charge sheet was only preliminary. In that context, the Court held that mere filing of a preliminary charge sheet without completing the investigation would not defeat the indefeasible statutory right of an accused to claim default bail. 140. In Chitra Ramkrishna (supra), it was held that a chargesheet can be filed only after the entire investigation covering "all" offences in the FIR is completed. Filing an incomplete or "piece-meal" chargesheet for only some offences while leaving the others under investigation violates Section 167(2), since it allows the investigating agency to improperly extend the accused's custody. 141. Similarly, in Avinash Jain (supra), a learned Single Judge, granted default bail to the applicant after finding that the CBI had filed an incomplete and piecemeal chargesheet that did not cover all offences mentioned in the FIR, particularly the offences under the PC Act for which investigation was still pending and sanction under Section 17A was yet to be obtained. The 97 High Court held that a chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC must reflect completion of the entire investigation for all offences, and filing a partial report solely to defeat the accused's statutory right under Section 167(2) is impermissible and violates Article 21. Since the investigation into PC Act offences remained open on the expiry of 60 days from arrest, the chargesheet was not held to be a valid final report. 142. In Tunde Gbaja (supra), the Delhi High Court dealt with a situation where the FIR contained several IPC offences requiring a 90-day investigation period, but the police filed a chargesheet only under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, which carried a 60-day limit. Although the agency could later file a supplementary chargesheet under Section 173(8) CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that an incomplete or part chargesheet cannot defeat an accused's right to default bail. Since the chargesheet did not cover the IPC offences listed in the FIR, the filing could not be treated as a valid chargesheet for purposes of Section 167(2), the accused was held entitled to default bail. 143. Turning to the present case, the State contends that the charge sheet filed on 19.07.2025 is a complete charge sheet covering all offences. The State further asserts that the charge sheet filed on 11.08.2025 against A.31 to A.33 is also complete in all respects and in accordance with Section 193(3) of the BNSS. It is also submitted that there is no bar to filing further reports as per Section 193(9) BNSS by following the procedure prescribed under sub-sections (3) to (8) of Section 193. A cursory examination of the charge sheets filed in the present case in the previous portion, prima facie supports this version. Viewed thus, the above referred decisions are distinguishable on facts to the present 98 case. In the case on hand, admittedly, chargesheet has not been filed against the remaining Accused. However, pendency of the further investigation against the other accused or for production of some more documents which were not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet filed against the present Accused, nor would it entitle them to be released on default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet for the purposes of Section 187 (3). 144. Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel had placed reliance on T.V. Sharma (supra) and Bandi Kotaiah (supra), both of which are also distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 145. In T.V. Sharma (supra), Accused Nos.1 to 4 faced charges under Sections 302 and 201 read with 34 IPC . They remained in judicial custody from 05.03.1975 to 03.05.1975, which is 60 days in total. As under the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the accused were entitled to be released after sixty days if they were prepared to furnish bail, the Learned Magistrate released them on bail on 03.05.1975. Aggrieved, the State and the deceased's father approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the said bail order. The Magistrate had opined that the preliminary charge sheet filed by the police was merely a remand report aimed at securing further remand under Section 309 Cr.P.C. and that Section 309 Cr.P.C. applies only after cognizance is taken, and not at the investigation stage. The Learned Single Judge upheld this reasoning, holding that a preliminary charge sheet is not a 'police report' under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. and that cognizance could not be taken on such a report. The Court relied on the Division Bench judgment in Bandi Kotaiah (supra), which 99 concerned Section 207(A) of the old Cr.P.C . 1898. The Learned Single Judge further noted the significant distinction between Section 344 Cr.P.C. 1898 and Section 309 Cr.P.C. 1973. Ultimately, the petitions were dismissed, and the Magistrate's grant of statutory bail was confirmed. As to the present case, the State contends that all objections raised by the office of the Learned Special Judge on 26.08.2025 (recorded on CFR on 01.09.2025) have been duly complied with. In light of Velidipuram (supra), delivered by the Division Bench of the then composite High Court, such compliance relates back to the date of filing of the charge sheet. In the present case, the charge sheet was filed within the statutory period. Moreover, the case is distinguishable from T.V. Sharma , (supra) where the so-called charge sheet which was merely a "remand report". 146. In Bandi Kotaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of the then Composite High Court considered the procedure under Section 207(A) Cr.P.C. 1898 governing enquiries in cases triable by a Sessions Court on a police report. Under that regime, the Magistrate recorded the testimony of witnesses during the enquiry, allowed cross-examination by the accused, and, depending on the evidence, either discharged the accused or committed the case to the Sessions Court. In that case, the Police had filed a preliminary charge sheet stating that the final charge sheet with complete witness lists would be filed later. The Magistrate numbered the case (PRC No.1/1964), remanded the accused, and adjourned the matter periodically for completion of the investigation. The final charge sheet was later filed only against A.1 to A.15. The challenge by a prosecution witness (Bandi Kotaiah) was that the Magistrate had 100 acted illegally by not proceeding against A.16 to A.18. The Division Bench, relying on R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.78 , held that mere numbering of a preliminary charge sheet and remanding the accused for the purpose of facilitating investigation does not amount to taking cognizance. Cognizance is taken only upon filing of the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the reference was answered holding that cognizance had been taken only after the filing of the final report. Needless to say, Bandi Kotaiah (supra) renders no assistance to the respondents herein. The reason is that the procedure under the Cr.P.C . 1898 was entirely different. Under that regime, Police commonly filed a preliminary report within 15 days, and Magistrates frequently extended remand to facilitate completion of investigation. There was no clear provision regarding release of the accused if the charge sheet was not filed within fifteen days. The issue in Bandi Kotaiah (supra) concerned the stage of cognizance, not the grant of default bail. In contrast, Section 167 of Cr.P.C. 1973 explicitly confers an indefeasible right to default bail if the police fail to file the report within the statutory period. This distinction is fundamental. 147. Further, an interesting argument has been taken by Sri Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 relying on Achpal (supra) that, as on the date of filing of default bail petition, the State had not complied with the objections pointed out by the learned trial Judge, as such, Accused No.32 got indefeasible right of default bail as it should be considered as if there is no chargesheet. In Achpal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing 78 AIR 1951 SC 207 101 with a situation wherein, FIR was lodged for serious offences, and the appellants (Accused 1 and 2) were arrested on 8.4.2018. While they remained in custody, the High Court on 3.7.2018 ordered that a higher-ranked officer (not below ASP) must complete the investigation within two months. The statutory 90-day period for filing a charge-sheet was set to end on 7.7.2018. Although a charge-sheet was filed on 5.7.2018, it was filed by an officer below the required rank and was therefore returned by the Magistrate. Thus, on 7.7.2018 no valid charge-sheet was on record, and the accused applied for default bail. The Magistrate rejected the application, calling the defect "technical" and treating the High Court's order as extending time. The High Court upheld this view, holding that a charge-sheet had been presented before 90 days, even though it was returned for not complying with its earlier order. 148. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Achpal (supra) noted that even though a charge-sheet was filed on 5.7.2018, it had been submitted by an officer below the rank promised before the High Court, which had directed that the investigation be done by a Gazetted Officer. As this requirement was not followed, the Magistrate returned the papers even before the 90-day period expired. The Hon'ble Supreme Court framed two key questions: (1) whether such an improper and non-compliant filing could be treated as "completion of investigation" under Section 167(2) CrPC to deny default bail, and (2) whether the High Court's earlier order could be interpreted as extending the statutory time for investigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the 90-day period expired, no valid Section 173 report was before the Magistrate because the charge-sheet filed on 5.7.2018 had been returned for non-compliance with 102 the High Court's direction that a Gazetted Officer conducts the investigation. As a result, the Magistrate had no material to assess whether further custody was justified, thereby depriving the accused of the statutory protection under Section 167(2). 149. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the accused could not be remanded without such judicial consideration and accepted the argument that default bail had accrued. With respect to the second issue in Achpal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court had no power to extend the statutory 60/90-day period for completing investigation under Section 167(2) CrPC, because the Code provides no mechanism for extension, except in special laws like TADA or MCOCA which expressly modify Section 167. In this case, the High Court's order dated 3.7.2018 merely recorded the Public Prosecutor's submission that a Gazetted Officer would complete the investigation within two months; it was held to not be an order of extension, especially since the High Court was not informed that the 90-day period was about to expire. 150. In the opinion of this Court, the reliance on Achpal (supra) is misplaced because the ratio in Achpal (supra) operates on an entirely different factual foundation. Achpal (supra) was a case where no charge sheet was before the Magistrate on the 90th day, because the report filed earlier was returned by the Magistrate for not being in conformity with the High Court's specific order directing investigation by a higher-ranked officer. Thus, on the crucial 90th day, zero papers were on the Magistrate's record, triggering the statutory right to default bail. To address this opinion better, it is relevant to 103 take note of the argument of Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.33 who submitted that, had the State has complied with such objections by the date of filing of their petition, the things would have been in a different way and in written arguments it was stated that the chargesheet was complete in all aspects only on 01.09.2025. 151. On the other hand, Sri Siddhartha Luthra would submit that the State have complied with the objections on 26.08.2025 itself and the same is mentioned in CFR on 01.09.2025, and therefore, though they have complied with the objections, the learned trial Judge has not referred the compliance in the order. 152. In Velinedipurnam (supra) before a Division Bench of the then Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the factual position was that the Accused was arrested on 15.06.1993, and the chargesheet was filed on 28.08.1993, within 90days. As it contained defects, the Magistrate returned it, and the corrected chargesheet was finally re-submitted only on 17.09.1993, the 95th day. The petitioner argued that since a complete and proper charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, he was entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. The Magistrate rejected his plea. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner approached High Court. In this context, it was observed as follows; "8. It is indisputable that the amendments or corrections relate back to the date of filing of the original document. In this view the rectification of defects or compliance with the objections will relate back to the date of filing as if the corrections are made at the time of filing the charge-sheet in the first instance and it 104 cannot be said that presentation was made on the date when the defects are rectified and represented." (emphasis supplied) 153. The same view was also expressed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Akula Ravi Teja (supra). More so, a cursory look at the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 would go to show that the learned Special Judge is aware of the compliance of the objections and also the law on the point that such compliance dates back to the filing of the charge sheet. If a mistake is committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting the report or the charge sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to produce the same with the permission of the Court. Return of charge sheet for compliance of certain defects, implies permission to cure the defects. In the present case, the charge sheet was returned on 23.08.2025 raising certain objections. By compliance with the said objections, the defects are rectified. Admittedly, the charge sheet was filed within the prescribed period of 90 days. Therefore, though the charge sheet is represented after curing the defects pointed out, beyond the period mentioned in the proviso to S.167(2) CrPC, it does not entitle the Accused to get default bail, when the charge sheet was originally filed within time. Even in the impugned order, as referred to supra, the learned trial Judge has clearly mentioned that some of the objections have been complied with. In that view, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for Accused Nos.32 and 33 falls to ground. 154. It is not out of place to mention that a judgment can operate as a precedent only when the facts and circumstances of that case are in pari 105 materia i.e., identical in material respects to those of the case at hand. It is therefore not correct to rely mechanically on decisions without examining whether the factual matrix therein. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and the facts of cited cases cannot be blindly treated as applicable. In simple words, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Moreover, it is also settled principle of law as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry,79 that a decision is binding not on its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken: 155. The Learned Special Judge opined that because of the defects pointed out viz., filing of chargesheet against a few, waiting for FSL reports, non-receipt of sanction and raids still being conducted, cognizance is not possible. At the same time, he cannot extend the remand of the accused beyond the statutory period of ninety days as in the case of the other special Acts and without taking cognizance custody under Section 309 (2) Cr.P.C. cannot be permitted. 156. In Suresh Bhikamchand Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically held that the cognizance is immaterial so far as Section 167 (2) is concerned and the accused continues to remain in the custody of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence. Relevant extracts from the decision are; 79 AIR 1967 SC 1480 106 "16. At this juncture, we may refer to certain dates which are relevant to the facts of this case, namely: (a) 11-3-2012 -- The petitioner arrested and remanded to police custody; (b) 25-4-2012 -- First charge-sheet filed against the four accused; (c) 1-6-2012 -- Supplementary charge-sheet filed in which the petitioner is named; (d) 30-7-2012 -- The trial court rejected the petitioner's prayer for grant of bail; (e) 13-9-2012 [ Suresh v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No. 3568 of 2012, order dated 13-9-2012 (Bom)] -- The High Court confirmed the order of the trial court; (f) 2-10-2012 -- Application filed under Section 167(2) CrPC before the trial court; (g) 5-10-2012 -- The trial court rejected the application under Section 167(2) CrPC. From the above dates, it would be evident that both the charge-sheet as also the supplementary charge-sheet were filed within 90 days from the date of the petitioner's arrest and remand to police custody. It is true that cognizance was not taken by the Special Court on account of failure of the prosecution to obtain sanction to prosecute the accused under the provisions of the PC Act , but does such failure amount to non-compliance with the provisions of Section 167(2) CrPC is the question with which we are confronted. 17. In our view, grant of sanction is nowhere contemplated under Section 167 CrPC. What the said section contemplates is the completion of investigation in respect of different types of cases within a stipulated period and the right of an accused to be released on bail on the failure of the investigating authorities to do so. The scheme of the provisions relating to remand of an accused, first during the stage of investigation and, thereafter, after cognizance is taken, indicates that the legislature intended investigation of certain crimes to be completed within 60 days and offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, within 90 days. In the event, the investigation is not completed by the 107 investigating authorities, the accused acquires an indefeasible right to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish bail. Accordingly, if on either the 61st day or the 91st day, an accused makes an application for being released on bail in default of charge-sheet having been filed, the court has no option but to release the accused on bail. The said provision has been considered and interpreted in various cases, such as the ones referred to hereinbefore. Both the decisions in Natabar Parida case [(1975) 2 SCC 220 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 484] and in Sanjay Dutt case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] were instances where the charge-sheet was not filed within the period stipulated in Section 167(2) CrPC and an application having been made for grant of bail prior to the filing of the charge-sheet, this Court held that the accused enjoyed an indefeasible right to grant of bail, if such an application was made before the filing of the charge- sheet, but once the charge-sheet was filed, such right came to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray for regular bail on merits. 18. None of the said cases detract from the position that once a charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated time, the question of grant of default bail or statutory bail does not arise. As indicated hereinabove, in our view, the filing of charge-sheet is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 167(2)(a)(ii) in this case. Whether cognizance is taken or not is not material as far as Section 167 CrPC is concerned. The right which may have accrued to the petitioner, had charge-sheet not been filed, is not attracted to the facts of this case. Merely because sanction had not been obtained to prosecute the accused and to proceed to the stage of Section 309 CrPC, it cannot be said that the accused is entitled to grant of statutory bail, as envisaged in Section 167 CrPC. The scheme of CrPC is such that once the investigation stage is completed, the court proceeds to the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial. An accused has to remain in custody of some court. During the period of investigation, the accused is under the custody of the Magistrate before whom he or she is first 108 produced. During that stage, under Section 167(2) CrPC, the Magistrate is vested with authority to remand the accused to custody, both police custody and/or judicial custody, for 15 days at a time, up to a maximum period of 60 days in cases of offences punishable for less than 10 years and 90 days where the offences are punishable for over 10 years or even death sentence. In the event, an investigating authority fails to file the charge-sheet within the stipulated period, the accused is entitled to be released on statutory bail. In such a situation, the accused continues to remain in the custody of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence, when the said court assumes custody of the accused for purposes of remand during the trial in terms of Section 309 CrPC. The two stages are different, but one follows the other so as to maintain a continuity of the custody of the accused with a court." (emphasis supplied) 157. In Rahul Modi (supra), before a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the issue whether an accused is entitled for statutory bail under Section 167(2) CrPC on the ground that cognizance has not been taken before the expiry of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, from the date of remand, arose for consideration. "15. A close scrutiny of the judgments in Sanjay Dutt (supra), Madar Sheikh (supra) and M. Ravindran (supra) would show that there is nothing contrary to what has been decided in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). In all the above judgments which are relied upon by either side, this Court had categorically laid down that the indefeasible right of an accused to seek statutory bail under Section 167(2) , CrPC arises only if the charge-sheet has not been filed before the expiry of the statutory period. Reference to 109 cognizance in Madar Sheikh (supra) is in view of the fact situation where the application was filed after the charge- sheet was submitted and cognizance had been taken by the trial court. Such reference cannot be construed as this Court introducing an additional requirement of cognizance having to be taken within the period prescribed under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) , CrPC, failing which the accused would be entitled to default bail, even after filing of the charge-sheet within the statutory period. It is not necessary to repeat that in both Madar Sheikh (supra) and M. Ravindran (supra), this Court expressed its view that non-filing of the charge-sheet within the statutory period is the ground for availing the indefeasible right to claim bail under Section 167(2) , CrPC. The conundrum relating to the custody of the accused after the expiry of 60 days has also been dealt with by this Court in Bhikamchand Jain (supra). It was made clear that the accused remains in custody of the Magistrate till cognizance is taken by the relevant court. As the issue that arises for consideration in this case is squarely covered by the judgment in Bhikamchand Jain (supra), the order passed by the High Court on 31.05.2019 is hereby set aside." (emphasis supplied) 158. The above position of law is again reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision of Judgebir (supra), as follows; "58. ....The scheme of CrPC is such that once the stage of investigation is completed, the court proceeds to the next stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial. During the period of investigation, the accused is under the custody of the Magistrate before whom he or she is first produced, with such Magistrate being vested with the power to remand the 110 accused to police custody and/or judicial custody, up to a maximum period as prescribed under Section 167(2) CrPC. Acknowledging the fact that an accused has to remain in custody of some court, this Court concluded that on filing of the charge-sheet within the stipulated period, the accused continues to remain in the custody of the Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence, when the said court assumes custody of the accused for purposes of remand during the trial in terms of Section 309CrPC. This Court clarified that the two stages are different, with one following the other so as to maintain continuity of the custody of the accused with a court." (emphasis supplied) 159. The learned Special Judge appears to have relied on the decision rendered by the Bombay High Court in Sarath Chandra Vinayak Dongre and others v. State of Maharashtra,80 which held that incomplete charge-sheets of the Code would not entitle the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences. In that matter, the prosecution filed five chargesheets along with applications seeking condonation of delay and permission to conduct further investigation and file an additional chargesheet within 6 months. Magistrate took cognizance and issued process and had also allowed the condonation of delay application without recording reasons and without hearing the accused. The High Court held that cognizance on an incomplete police report which cannot be treated as a "police report" at all as contemplated under Section 173(2), was without jurisdiction and therefore quashed the entire proceedings, including the issuance of process. 80 1991CRILJ 3329 111 160. Thereafter, in appeal before a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as State of Maharashtra v. Sarath Chandra Vinayak Dongre and others,81 the decision of the Bombay High Cour to the extent of quashing the condonation of delay without notice was upheld, whereas the quashing of cognizance and issuing of process was overturned calling it patently erroneous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the police report with the details as required under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether a case for taking cognizance is made out or not by applying his mind. It was categorically held that the prayer of the investigating agency seeking permission to further investigate and submit a "supplementary chargesheet" could not vitiate the cognizance taken by the Magistrate nor denude him of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. Relevant portion from the decision is as follows; "7. The purpose of the submission of the police report with the details as mentioned above, is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself, whether on the basis of the report and the material filed along with the police report, a case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. After applying his mind to the police report and the material submitted therewith, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure . Section 190(1)(b) CrPC provides that a Magistrate has the power to take cognizance upon a police report of such facts as are provided therein on being satisfied that the case is a fit one for taking cognizance of the 81 (1995) 1 SCC 42 112 offence. Therefore, if the police report and the material filed therewith is sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate that he should take cognizance, his power is not fettered by the label which the investigating agency chooses to give to the report submitted by it under Section 173(2) CrPC. Merely, because the prosecution had filed an application, after submission of the charge-sheet, seeking permission to file "supplementary charge-sheet", it could not affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance, if he was otherwise satisfied from the material placed before him along with the charge-sheet that cognizance of the offence was required to be taken. It is the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and Magistrate alone to decide whether the material placed by the prosecution with the report (charge- sheet) was sufficient to take cognizance or not. The power of the Magistrate to take cognizance cannot be controlled by the investigating agency, whose duty is only to investigate and place the facts and the evidence before the Magistrate." (emphasis supplied) 161. Therefore, the reliance of the learned Special Judge on the decision of the Bombay High Court which is overturned on that point by a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is legally flawed. Instead of taking recourse to the steps provided in Bhagwant Singh (supra), the learned Special Judge's insistence that there is no other option than to grant default bail because cognizance was not taken and he cannot show custody under Section 309(2) of Cr.P.C. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to state that the argument advanced by Sri Sidharth Luthra that automatically after the expiry of 90 days, Section 113 309 comes into play holds no water. It is not uncommon to see that though the prosecution files Charge sheet within time, it may take some time for the Court to take cognizance. This exercise sometimes may take time. It does not automatically entitle any accused to sought for default bail. 162. The view of the learned Special Judge is also directly contrary to the clear and categorical holding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rahul Modi ,(supra) after examining Sanjay Dutt (supra), Madar Sheikh (supra), M. Ravindran (supra) and Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain , (supra), it was held that "filing of a charge-sheet is sufficient compliance with Section 167(2) , CrPC and an accused cannot demand default bail on the ground that cognizance has not been taken" CONCLUSION 163. In view of the discussion made supra, the conclusions to each question are tabulated below; a. Whether an Accused is i. The indefeasible right of an accused entitled to default bail under to seek statutory bail under proviso proviso to Section 187 (3)(ii) of to Section Section 187 (3)(ii) of BNSS when the chargesheet, BNSS, exhausts the moment a though filed within the statutory chargesheet in compliance to period, is returned on certain Section 193 (3) is filed within the defects, which are subsequently statutory period. complied? ii. The word "shall" used in Section 193(6) of BNSS is directory and not mandatory. iii. Nature and gravity of these defects are to be seen case to case basis. 114 Rectification of defects/compliance with objections will relate back to the date of filing as if the corrections are made at the time of filing the charge-sheet in the first instance. b. Whether mere seeking of i. Even after submission of police report permission for further under Section 193(3) on completion of investigation would make the investigation, the police has right for investigation incomplete and "further" investigation under Section consequently the chargesheet 193(9) but not "fresh investigation" or incomplete for the purposes of "reinvestigation". default bail under proviso to ii. Mere seeking of permission for further Section 187(3)(ii) of the BNSS? investigation would not lead to the right to statutory bail under proviso to Section 187(3)(ii) of the BNSS. c. Whether taking cognizance When a chargesheet is filed within the of the case is precondition for statutory period and in compliance to extending remand of an Accused Section 193 (3) of the BNSS, merely after the filing of the charge sheet because cognizance of the offence is not within the statutory period, and taken would not be a ground to grant whether the Court's inability to statutory bail. Accused remains in take cognizance can be a ground custody of the Magistrate till cognizance for default bail? is taken. 164. A Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aslam Babalal Desai (supra), observed that when two views or interpretations are possible, in the field of criminal justice involving the liberty of an individual, the one in favour of the Accused should be adopted. 115 165. A close scrutiny of the decisions in Sanjay Dutt (supra), Madar Sheikh (supra), Suresh Kumar Bikamchand Jain (supra), Rahul Modi (supra), Bhagavanth Singh (supra), Dinesh Dalmia (supra), Kapil Wadhawan (supra), Judgebir Singh (supra), Dablu Kujur (supra), and Sharif Ahmed (supra) which were relied on by either side, show that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically laid down that the indefeasible right of an accused to seek statutory bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.,(corresponding to Section 187 (3) BNSS) which is a fundamental right under Article 21 , exists only when the Police fails to file the chargesheet within the statutory period of 60/90 days, as the case maybe. In the present case, the police report filed on 19.07.2025 and the supplementary report filed on 11.08.2025 were both submitted before the expiry of the statutory period in respect of all the Accused herein. The Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami (supra), clearly held that the statutory requirement of the report under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed therein are included in the report. The reports herein also contain all necessary particulars as required under Section 193(3) BNSS (corresponding to Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C.) to enable the learned Special Judge to proceed with the matter. Furthermore, if any further investigation is required in respect of Respondents/ Accused Nos. 31 to 33, it would only be in addition to what had already been gathered by the Investigating Officer as of the date of filing the supplementary report, as contemplated under Section 193(9) Cr.P.C. In that view, this Court has no hesitation to say that the questions of law falling for consideration before this Court do not give any scope to entertain two views. 116 166. In the light of the above legal analysis, this Court is of the view that the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 warrant interference of this Court as they are unsustainable on the touchstone of settled principles of law. However, as already enunciated, this Court is not inclined to go into the question of quashing the official Memoranda, as they are essentially an administrative act. RESULT: 167. In that view of the matter, the Criminal Petitions are allowed in part, quashing the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases-cum- III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada in Crl.M.P. Nos., 1446, 1447 and 1467 of 2025 pertaining to Crime No.21/2024 (CID Police Station,Mangalagiri). Consequently, the Respondents/ Accused Nos., 31, 32 and 33 are directed to surrender before the Learned Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases-cum-III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada on or before 26.11.2025. 168. Needless to state, Accused Nos., 31 32 and 33 may seek regular bail and the learned Special Judge may deal with the same on their own merits. 169. It is clarified that observations made in this judgment are on the question of law arising on default bail and cannot be construed as an opinion on merits relating to Crime No.21/2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand closed. DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA 19.11.2025 Mjl/* Dinesh LR copy to be marked Related AI tags, queries and research notes Translation About Disclaimer Privacy Policy Terms Case Removal Blog Share URL Mobile View ⚖ Case Recast AI